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In this modern era ruled by technology and the IoT (Internet of Things),
embedded systems have an ubiquitous presence in our daily lives. Although they
do differ from each other in their functionalities and end-purpose, they all share the
same basic requirements: safety and security. Whether in a non-critical system
such as a smartphone, or a critical one, like an electronic control unit of any
modern vehicle, these requirements must always be fulfilled in order to accomplish
a reliable and trust-worthy system.
One well-established technology to address this problem is virtualization. It
provides isolation by encapsulating each subsystem in separate Virtual-Machines
(VMs), while also enabling the sharing of hardware resources. However, these
isolated subsystems may still need to communicate with each other. Inter-Process
Communication is present in most OSes’ stacks, representing a crucial part of
it, which allows, through a myriad of different mechanisms, communication be-
tween tasks. In a virtualized system, Inter-Partition Communication mechanisms
implement the communication between the different subsystems referenced above.
TrustZone technology has been in the forefront of hardware-assisted security
and it has been explored for virtualization purposes, since natively it provides sep-
aration between two execution worlds while enforcing, by design, different privi-
lege to these execution worlds. LTZVisor, an open-source lightweight TrustZone-
assisted hypervisor, emerged as a way of providing a platform for exploring how
TrustZone can be exploited to assist virtualization. Its IPC mechanism, TZ-
VirtIO, constitutes a standard virtual I/O approach for achieving communication
between the OSes, but some overhead is caused by the introduction of the mech-
anism. Hardware-based solutions are yet to be explored with this solution, which
could bring performance and security benefits while diminishing overhead.
Attending the reasons mentioned above, hTZ-VirtIO was developed as a way
to explore the offloading of the software-based communication mechanism of the




Atualmente, onde a tecnologia e a Internet das Coisas (IoT) dominam a so-
ciedade, os sistemas embebidos são omnipresentes no nosso dia-a-dia, e embora
possam diferir entre as funcionalidades e objetivos finais, todos partilham os mes-
mos requisitos básicos. Seja um sistema não crítico, como um smartphone, ou
um sistema crítico, como uma unidade de controlo de um veículo moderno, estes
requisitos devem ser cumpridos de maneira a se obter um sistema confiável.
Uma tecnologia bem estabelecida para resolver este problema é a virtualiza-
ção. Esta abordagem providencia isolamento através do encapsulamento de sub-
sistemas em máquinas virtuais separadas, além de permitir a partilha de recursos
de hardware. No entanto, estes subsistemas isolados podem ter a necessidade de
comunicar entre si. Comunicação entre tarefas está presente na maioria das pilhas
de software de qualquer sistema e representa uma parte crucial dos mesmos. Num
sistema virtualizado, os mecanismos de comunicação entre-partições implementam
a comunicação entre os diferentes subsistemas mencionados acima.
A tecnologia TrustZone tem estado na vanguarda da segurança assistida por
hardware, e tem sido explorada na implementação de sistemas virtualizados, visto
que permite nativamente a separação entre dois mundos de execução, e impondo
ao mesmo tempo, por design, privilégios diferentes a esses mundos de execução. O
LTZVisor, um hypervisor em código-aberto de baixo overhead assistido por Trust-
Zone, surgiu como uma forma de fornecer uma plataforma que permite a explo-
ração da TrustZone como tecnologia de assistência a virtualização. O TZ-VirtIO,
mecanismo de comunicação do LTZVisor, constitui uma abordagem padrão de
E/S virtuais, para permitir comunicação entre os sistemas operativos. No entanto,
a introdução deste mecanismo provoca sobrecarga sobre o hypervisor. Soluções
baseadas em hardware para o TZ-VirtIO ainda não foram exploradas, e podem
trazer benefícios de desempenho e segurança, e diminuir a sobrecarga.
Atendendo às razões mencionadas acima, o hTZ-VirtIO foi desenvolvido como
uma maneira de explorar a migração do mecanismo de comunicação baseado em
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1. Introduction
More and more, society is becoming more technologically advanced, with com-
puters being part of almost all common devices and services. Although people
are aware of them and interact directly with some (personal computers, smart-
phones, automotive infotainment systems, etc,), most computers are small and
unnoticeable (smart home appliances, barcode scanners, automotive electronic
control units, etc.), and are becoming ubiquitous in our daily lives. These are
usually referred to as embedded systems. Furthermore, every category of smart
devices need, increasingly, to be connected with each other, either with other sur-
rounding systems, or with devices all around the globe. This has led to the rise of
the now infamous concept of IoT (Internet of Things).
Far from just a theoretical concept however, IoT devices have been increasing
in both quantity and complexity while following trends towards small-form factor
(i.e., reduced in size). In fact, system engineers aim to follow an assortment of
standardized metrics, the SWaP-C (Size, Weight, Power and Cost) metrics, when
designing embedded systems. The goal should be to keep these metrics as low as
possible without compromising performance and the effectiveness of the system.
Accomplishing all of these requirements might be a difficult task, but its intricacies
still quiver when faced with the added complication of maintaining device integrity,
especially in critical systems, where failure is not an option. Basically, divided into
safety and security concerns, these critical embedded systems must preserve their
integrity throughout execution, and this means that these devices must be safe
and secure. This is especially relevant when considering that IoT end-devices
are burdened with the task of exchanging great quantities of security-critical and
privacy-sensitive data all over the globe, and are also much more prone to cyber-
attacks [PGP+17].
So, because the demand for smaller, more complex and more powerful system
was ever-growing, coupled with the need for security in these same systems, there
was also an obvious need for technological evolution to support such trend. To
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achieve embedded systems with such characteristics, researchers turned to vir-
tualization [Hei08, Kai09]. Because virtualization enables concurrent execution
of multiple virtual machines on the same hardware platform while also enabling
sharing of hardware resources, not only does it prove to be a great candidate for
the reduction of the SWaP-C metrics, but it also tackles problems associated with
security threats, providing security by isolation.
First off, the SWaP-C benefits of consolidating multiple systems in a single
platform is evident, as eliminating excess of federated hardware resources will
greatly reduce all of these metrics. Also, in a virtualization environment, although
the various partitions share the same hardware resources, they are segregated
from each other, which helps to settle some security concerns. It is not easy
however, to achieve an effective system that consolidates what were previously
multiple systems in one hardware platform and still keep the same performance
and real-time capabilities without compromising security. This kept researchers
trying to find new strategies that would be able to achieve the desired metrics
while keeping up with demand. Naturally, solutions evolved to make use of the
underlying hardware platform to help the software layer, both in performance and
security departments.
The first adopted strategy was hardware-assisted virtualization, which quickly
became the norm in virtualized embedded systems solutions. Leading SoC man-
ufacturers, mainly ARM and Intel, started incorporating hardware virtualization
technology (ARM’s Virtualization Extensions and Intel’s Virtualization Technol-
ogy) in their SoCs. This enabled system designers to make use of the underlying
hardware platform to greatly reduce software virtualization overhead. Further-
more, ARM’s TrustZone technology, which in fact is not a virtualization extension
per se, but rather a security extension technology, quickly became the preferred
solution amongst researchers in the embedded systems domain. Its, by design,
division into secure and non-secure worlds led to the development of a myriad
of dual-guest hypervisors which made use of TrustZone’s hardware separation to
completely isolate the trusted from non-trusted components, forbidding the non-
trusted, less privileged components from affecting the most-critical trusted parti-
tions of the system [SHT10, KLJ+13, LCP+17, POP+17]. Furthermore, other so-
lution that was followed to achieve performance improvements in these embedded
IoT devices, was hardware offloading [GPG+15]. By offloading some of the more
overhead-heavy software components to an FPGA SoC, designers were able to get
more efficient systems with the small disadvantage of additional hardware costs.
Either by being used as a standalone hardware offloading technique [GSP+16], or
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as an addition to an already hardware-assisted virtualization system [XPN15a],
hardware offloading has been gaining traction as one of the most used strategies
for embedded systems solutions.
One of these hardware-assisted implementations is the in-house LTZVisor, an
open-source, Lightweight, TrustZone-assisted hypervisor capable of running in a
dual-OS configuration, usually an OS with real-time capabilities in the secure
world for the time-critical tasks, and a General-Purpose OS for user interaction.
Although these partitions need to be completely isolated, they sometimes need
to transfer information between them. As such, LTZVisor implements a secure,
shared-memory communication mechanism, TZ-VirtIO [OMC+18], thus providing
a way for OSes to share data between them.
To demonstrate how a communication channel might be useful in these kinds
of systems, we could make an use-case out of a virtualized embedded system for
a system comprised of an automotive electronic control unit and an infotainment
dashboard. Figure 1.1 represents, at a very basic level, how LTZVisor and TZ-
VirtIO handle communication between two OSes in the same hardware platform.
In this situation, the RTOS will handle the critical portion of the system, collecting
data from the electronic control unit while managing some important hardware
mechanisms. Meanwhile, the GPOS will handle the infotainment system, which
includes displaying some important information collected by the electronic control
unit. So, because these systems are virtualized and not aware of each other,
there is the need for a communication strategy between the two, and the regular
networking over-the-air connection is not an option for a system with this level of
criticality. This is where TZ-VirtIO comes in as a secure communication channel
between the two, allowing for systems to share data through the hardware platform
while preventing the untrusted partition from affecting the trusted, secure one.
This strategy however, does bring a lot of software overhead to the system,
overhead which might be fatal for the real-time requirements of the system. For
instance, assuming a situation where the RTOS partition of the system is both
handling the breaking system while collecting and sending data to the GPOS
side, the CPU should not be stalled while transferring data, as it will keep the
real-time partition from acting accordingly when the driver needs to act on the
brakes, as it could obviously jeopardise the safety of the vehicle’s passengers. One
solution for this problem, could be the aforementioned hardware offloading of the
transferring mechanism. If the data transfer is executed in hardware, the CPU
would be freed for more critical tasks, and thus the safety of the system would
not be compromised. Furthermore, if migrated to hardware, the data throughput






Figure 1.1: General Automotive Communication Use-Case
could be much greater than that of a software-based solution and thus it also
improves overall system performance.
1.1 Goals
To better assert if the aforementioned TZ-VirtIO hardware offloading would be
an effective alternative, this thesis proposes the evaluation of the advantages and
disadvantages of modifying the current mechanism to include an hardware-based
approach. As such the main goal of this thesis should be the implementation of
dedicated hardware mechanisms capable of replacing the TZ-VirtIO’s data chan-
nel, and the subsequent comparison between the implemented strategies.
Firstly, an extensive study on the current State of the Art must be carried out,
alongside an in-depth familiarization with the used platform and tools necessary
for the implementation of this project. Thus, the proposed methodology for this
project will be as follows:
1. In-depth State of the Art review, analysing the many previously used strate-
gies and implementations, as well as the theoretical fundamentals for this
thesis. This research should be carried on throughout the implementation
phase, as the State of the Art could be continuously updated.
2. Extensive exploration of the used platform and tools, including the Zynq-
7000 SoC, ARM’s TrustZone technology, LTZVisor and TZ-VirtIO, as well
as a painstaking understanding of the used hardware mechanisms.
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3. Implementation of the different proposed hardware solutions, including its
integration in the complete system.
4. Extensive evaluation and comparison of the achieved solutions.
5. Detailed writing of this document, including the whole of the aforementioned
efforts, as well as the thesis’ findings.
Further chapters will delve deeper into each phase of the project.
1.2 Document Structure
In this section will be presented how this document’s chapters are structured,
as well as their contents and purpose. The structure is as follows:
1. Introduction (current chapter): explains the motivation around this thesis,
as well as its main goals.
2. Background, Context, and State of the Art: covers the theoretical
fundamentals and other works related to this thesis. It covers TrustZone
technology, virtualization and hardware-assisted virtualization, and explains
Inter-Partition Communication mechanisms, followed by relevant implemen-
tations that make use of these fundamentals.
3. Platform and Tools: goes over the platform and tools used in this project,
including both hardware and software platforms, and diving deeper into the
more relevant topics.
4. hTZ-VirtIO: Hardware IPC Mechanism for LTZVisor: demonstrates
the implementation of the various components, including the hardware mod-
ules and their integration in the software platform.
5. Evaluation: presents the ultimate findings and comparisons, as well as a
discussion on them.
6. Conclusion: final conclusion of the document, discussing its relevancy to
the community after the complete research and implementation is termi-
nated. Also presents some future work that might be relevant for further
research.

2. Background, Context, and State
of the Art
This chapter will present the fundamental concepts needed for the develop-
ment of this project, as well as some existing related work relevant to the thesis’
theme. It starts by explaining and contextualising virtualization, with focus on
the embedded computing domain, followed by a breakdown on how Inter-Partition
Communication is relevant to any embedded system, virtualized or not. The "Re-
lated Work" section presents several IPC mechanisms that are somehow related
to the developed communication mechanism.
2.1 Background
This section will explore the background concepts and theoretical fundamentals
that are relevant to this thesis, starting by explaining classical virtualization tech-
niques, followed by Hardware-assisted, and more specifically TrustZone-assisted,
virtualization. Secondly, IPC is introduced, focusing on its importance to embed-
ded systems design alongside various mechanisms, including some hardware-based
ones. Lastly, the VirtIO system is briefly explained.
2.1.1 Virtualization
For the everyday computer user, the word "virtualization" is, almost always,
attached solely to the notion of a computer program atop a General-Purpose Oper-
ating System (GPOS), that is, capable of emulating another GPOS. Unbeknownst
to the common user, virtualization technology is being used in a myriad of elec-
tronic devices from their quotidian, although at a much deeper abstraction level
from that of a normal user-level virtualization software. Rather, the original and
more common use of virtualization consists on an abstraction layer directly above
the hardware platform (i.e. system-level virtualization).
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For either application, this abstraction layer, commonly referred to as Vir-
tual Machine Monitor (VMM) or hypervisor, is responsible for multiplexing the
resources available to one or more Virtual-Machines (VM). This also allows the
VMs, acting as Guests, to run in an isolated environment, while the hypervisor,
acting as the Host, arbitrates the VMs’ scheduling policy and mediates hardware
access, as it runs in an higher privilege level than the Virtual Machines running on
top of it. These Guests can be either full fledged OSes or bare-metal applications
and in both cases, they may or may not have to be ported to run successfully. This
gives us the distinction between full virtualization, where the Guests’ code needs
no alterations or additions and is unaware of running atop an hypervisor, and
paravirtualization, where a Guest is ported to run in top of a specific hypervisor
while being aware that is doing so. Both techniques have their advantages, being
the most obvious, the easiness of incorporation of Guests on the full virtualization
strategy, and the performance boost from having hypervisor compliant APIs on
paravirtualization’s side.
Depending on the position of the virtualization layer in the software stack, it
is possible to distinguish two types of hypervisor, represented in Figure 2.1:
• Type-1, or bare-metal hypervisors, have direct access to the hardware layer
and manage the execution permissions of every system component, mean-
ing all hardware accesses are to be mediated and controlled by the VMM.
As a consequence, the performance degradation of guest OSes will only be
influenced by the performance of the hypervisor itself, making this type of
hypervisor more suited to systems that must meet time constraints and also,
the usual choice for an embedded system application.
• Type-2, or hosted hypervisors, do not run directly above the hardware layer.
Instead, they run over a OS that is already executing. This type of VMM
usually does not have permissions to access and perform any operation on
the hardware directly, since those responsibilities usually rest in the system
software that runs below the VMM, usually resulting in lower performance
ratings compared to type-1 hypervisors.
From this point forward throughout this document, we refer to an "Hypervisor"
to convey a type-1 hypervisor, as this is the type of virtualization layer used in
this thesis’ work.
To properly partition a system to support concurrent execution of multiple
VMs, a basic set of efforts must be achieved [BDF+03]. Firstly, the virtual ma-
chines must be isolated from each other, as they should not affect or be affected













Figure 2.1: Hypervisor Types
by one another. This rule should be more relevant in the case of a critical system,
where for instance, one of the VMs is a Real-Time Operating System (RTOS)
which must meet real-time constraints. More on this subject will be explored
ahead. The hypervisor should also be able to run a variety of Operating Systems,
depending on the heterogeneity of the desired system, although this may not be
important in most low-end embedded system applications. Lastly, there should
be a low performance overhead induced by the introduction of the virtualization
layer.
This offers great advantages for modern embedded systems, as the smaller
form-factor, achieved by the consolidation of multiple systems in a single hard-
ware platform, is a crucial part of any of these systems [Hei11, GGS+14]. Fur-
thermore, and as mentioned before, the ability to conjugate a general-purpose
operating system for user-friendly applications, with a real-time operating system
for carrying out time-critical tasks (e.g. infotainment/automotive control systems,
smartphones), is greatly assisted by virtualization technology [Hei08, ISM09]. For
critical embedded systems though, there is another major advantage brought on
by virtualization, the safety and security achieved by its spatial and temporal
isolation. Isolation achieved by a virtualization solution is more greatly imposed,
compared to any typical OS, as it is accomplished by design [Hei08, Kai08].
Considering the benefits of virtualization, it is no surprise that, along with
the growth in functionality in consumer electronics (CE) [Hei09], or the growth
in complexity, criticality and quantity of spatial/aeronautical systems [PPG+17],
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or the rise of embedded automotive solutions merging infotainment and critical
systems [RM14], there has also been a rise in embedded solutions making use
of virtualization technology for their system, as they all share the same interest:
consolidating their systems while maintaining isolation.
Virtualization however, comes with its own drawbacks, being the unavoidable
performance overhead the biggest one amongst problems of embedded systems’ vir-
tualization. Another hindrance of classical virtualization used in critical embedded
systems is the creation of a single point of failure, the VMM, which alongside its
usual complexity and largeness of its trusted computing based (TCB), makes it
both a easy target for hackers while also extremely bug prominent [GGS+14].
To solve these problems, a myriad of different solutions have been proposed:
the first option adopted was to reduce the TCB size, by simply implementing ei-
ther lightweight or microkernel versions of hypervisors, as seen in [HL10, ISM09];
another popular option was to make use of virtualization hardware extensions
like Intel’s Virtualization Technology [UNR+05, NSL+06], ARM’s Virtualization
Extensions [MN11] and TrustZone (TZ) [ARM09] technology, as seen in [DN14,
YSA+06, PTM16]; many solutions also applied a combination of both hardware
extensions and TCB reduction, as seen in [PPG+17, MAC+17]; some solutions im-
plemented hardware acceleration [XPN15b] and even going as far as experimenting
with dynamic partial reconfiguration-assisted hypervisors [XPN15a].
2.1.2 ARM TrustZone
As this thesis project uses an hypervisor with TrustZone-assisted virtualization
as its core, we should delve deeper in the TrustZone architecture and how it works.
ARM TrustZone [ARM09] technology refers to the security extensions intro-
duced by ARM with its ARMv6 architecture in their Cortex-A processors [PS], but
which recently made way to the Cortex-M line of processors, beginning with the
ARMv8-M architecture. TrustZone technology for both lines of processors share
the same basic design features, the only difference being the optimization for mi-
crocontrolers and low-power applications for the M family of processors [MAC+17].
From this point on, this thesis will focus on TrustZone for the Cortex-A family of
processors.
The simplest way to view TrustZone technology is as a dual-virtual system,
where all its physical resources are partitioned into two isolated virtualized execu-
tion environments (Figure 2.2). This separation into secure and non-secure world
happens on almost every aspect of the TrustZone-enabled System-on-Chip’s archi-
tecture, with greater relevance at the processor architecture level. The secure and
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Figure 2.2: ARM TrustZone Technology
non-secure world separation is indicated by a TrustZone exclusive 33rd processor
bit, the NS (Non-Secure) bit, which also extends to the memory and remaining
peripherals buses. There is also an extra processor mode, monitor mode, added
by TrustZone, as a way to ensure preservation of the processor state during the
world switch. This mode does not depend on the state of the NS processor bit, as
it runs with an higher privilege level than that of the other processor modes, and
thus always considered secure [MAC+17].
To bridge the software stacks of both worlds, as the processor can only run
in one world at a time, a new privileged instruction was added, the SMC (Secure
Monitor Call) instruction. There is also the possibility of entering monitor mode
by configuring it to handle interruptions and abort exceptions in the secure world.
To further ensure isolation, TrustZone specifies one set of exception vector table for
the normal world, one for the secure world, and another for the monitor mode. To
handle both secure and non-secure interrupts, the Generic Interrupt Controller
(GIC) provides both secure and non-secure prioritized interrupt sources, while
also having the ability to prioritize secure interrupts over non-secure interrupts.
Furthermore, TrustZone banks a set of special registers to enforce secure and non-
secure world isolation, such as a number of System Control Coprocessor (CP15)
registers, forbidding the non-secure world of accessing these registers, or at least
only being able to access them under the supervision of the secure world.
As mentioned before, the NS bit extends to memory and devices as to main-
tain world separation on access to these components. This however, is not enough
to ensure strong isolation between the worlds and as such, a number of hardware
peripherals are added. These include the TrustZone Address Space Controller
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(TZASC) and the TrustZone Memory Adapter (TZMA) to extend TrustZone se-
curity to the memory, and the TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC) to extend
TrustZone functionalities to other system devices.
The TZASC, only programmable from the secure world, is able to partition the
DRAM into different, secure or non-secure, memory regions. TrustZone allows, by
design, the secure side to access the non-secure memory regions while forbidding
the opposite operation. TZMA also provides the same memory separation features
but for external ROM and SRAM. The Memory Management Unit (MMU) is also
TrustZone compliant, providing two distinct MMU interfaces and thus enabling
each world to have a local set of virtual-to-physical memory address translation
tables. TrustZone security also extends to cache-level, since processor’s caches
include an additional security tag to signal in which state the processor accesses
the memory. Furthermore, device security status can be dynamically changed
during runtime via the TZPC, which supplies control signals to the various de-
vices. All three of these TrustZone hardware controllers are of optional use and
implementation-specific.
2.1.3 TrustZone-assisted Virtualization
Hardware-assisted virtualization is no news to the embedded system world, as
hardware support for virtualization is one of the more common solutions for em-
bedded, virtualization applications. In previous sections, we mentioned hardware
extensions from Intel and ARM, both of which have been researched extensively
and, although they all have their benefits, ARM’s TrustZone technology has been
the main focus among researchers, despite the fact of TrustZone extensions not
being virtualization-oriented, but mainly security-oriented (Figure 2.3).
Some of TrustZone’s features however, are similar to other hardware-assisted
virtualization techniques. In fact, TrustZone’s higher privilege mode, unprivi-
leged modes for guest OSes, and the ability to have full control over the excep-
tion system, all mean that TrustZone is a suitable candidate for an hardware-
assisted virtualization strategy. TrustZone however, does not permit a classical
full-virtualization approach. By only featuring memory support through Trust-
Zone peripherals, such as the TZASC and the TZMA, and not providing two-level
address translation, it demands guests to be specifically compiled to run in their
designed memory segments. Their code however, does not need to be modified,
and thus, still leans more to a full-virtualization strategy, than to a paravirtualiza-
tion one. This and other smaller disadvantages, do not alienate TrustZone from
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Figure 2.3: ARM TrustZone Technology
being a viable solution for embedded use-cases, especially considering the ubiquity
of ARM platforms in everyday embedded devices.
Some of the most famous dual-guest TrustZone-based hypervisors include:
• SafeG makes use of TrustZone to implement a dual-OS configuration. It
consists of a RTOS in the secure world for time-critical tasks and a GPOS in
the non-secure world. SafeG also includes a health monitoring mechanism, a
secure device sharing mechanism, and a cyclic and priority-based scheduling
approach [SHT10].
• SASP or Secure Automotive Software Platform, also implements a dual-OS,
RTOS and GPOS, configuration with focus on secure device access [KLJ+13].
• VOSYSmonitor like the others implements dual-OS virtualization but,
unlike the other, over the newer ARMv8-A architecture. [LCP+17].
• Finally, LTZVisor also features a dual-OS configuration but, unlike the
others, is an open-source hypervisor. More will be explained about this
hypervisor as this will be the platform used in this thesis’ work [PPG+17].
Some solutions go further and utilize TrustZone in a multi-guest (more than
two) hypervisor application. hypervisors like the RTZVisor and its successor,
the µRTZVisor, run multiple guest OSes once at a time on the Non-Secure side,
relying on the MMU’s support for 2-level address translation, to map guest-virtual
to guest-physical addresses and then guest-physical to host-physical addresses,
which is crucial to maintain isolation between partitions [PTM16]. The latter
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derives from the first, making use of a microkernel approach and capability-based
IPC mechanism as key differences [MAC+17].
Furthermore, others make use of a FPGA SoC’s hardware extensibility along
with TrustZone hardware extensions to maximize virtualization performance while
reducing software overhead. The greatest example is Xia’s Mini-NOVA [XPN15a],
which, like the µRTZVisor, makes use of a microkernel approach while adding
dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) to implement dynamically reconfigurable
hardware tasks.
2.1.4 IPC
Traditionally, IPC refers to the inter-process communication mechanism in any
modern OS. It constitutes a crucial part of any OS as it allows processes to share
data between each other. Although ubiquitous and sharing, more or less, the
same final purpose, IPC mechanisms differ greatly in many core characteristics,
depending on the use-case application, hardware and software resources available,
and many other system attributes. In fact, in a mircokernel-oriented OS, the IPC
mechanism is of even greater importance, since the out-of-kernel components rely
on IPC to share information between each other [HEK+07, Lie93b, SFS96].
On a virtualization environment, there may also be the need for a communi-
cation mechanism. Although this mechanism is usually still referred to as IPC,
it actually stands for inter-partition communication. Other denominations in-
clude inter-VM communication and inter-domain communication. Usually, com-
munication between virtual-machines is done through a TCP/IP network stack.
This method however, does not represent a practical solution for an embedded
system hypervisor, where most communication is critical and with the need of
being executed in the shortest amount of time possible. This makes TCP/IP
communication unpratical for this kind of scenario, as it induces too much of a
performance overhead on the system, having the possibility of being as high as
the communication cost of transferring data between VMs located on separate
physical machines [RLZ+16]. Instead, the best strategy should be to make use of
the underlying hypervisor layer to manage the communication between partitions,
while still maintaining communication abstraction for the VMs (Figure 2.4).
To maintain separation between VMs, and because the basic rules of virtualiza-
tion tell us that there must be isolation between partitions, the IPC mechanism
must be responsible for guaranteeing that Guests are isolated from each other
while sharing data between them. This is of greater relevance in security critical
scenarios, as an attack on one of the VMs should not affect the other partitions,







Figure 2.4: General Dual-OS Communication Use-Case
or the system itself. [TGB+08] presents us with a basic set of rules to follow when
designing a trustworthy, dependable and secure IPC mechanism, including: reli-
able message delivery and overall integrity, independent IPC calls, impossible to
snoop message traffic, etc.
2.1.4.1 IPC Mechanisms
IPC mechanisms used in virtualization solutions are, with some minor differ-
ences, equivalent to those present in most OSes. They can be classified in relation
to their synchronism, privilege level, and overall message transfer mechanism. Nat-
urally, these differences translate into performance, security and memory footprint
metrics fluctuations, making them ideal for different situations. In this section we
will explore this mechanisms and their advantages and disadvantages for the dif-
ferent scenarios.
Regarding synchronism, communication can be divided into:
• Synchronous communication or blocking communication: Each parti-
tion must wait for the other partition’s response, so that they meet at a
given moment to proceed with communication. An example use-case could
be: a partition sending a message is in a sending state, specifying the message
to be transferred, while the receiver partition is prepared for the acceptance
of a new message, specifying the incoming messages buffer. If sender and
receiver must be synchronized to complete the message transfer, one of the
partitions must be blocked while waiting for the interdependent operation.
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This method usually entails performance and resource management benefits,
since the message transfer is made with the least amount of copies possible,
reducing message latency and kernel buffering [EH13]. Regarding security,
a synchronous IPC design should take in consideration some extra factors,
as these type of mechanisms are prone to Denial-of-Service (more commonly
known as DoS) attacks, or even unintended deadlocks.
Another concern of synchronous IPC mechanisms is the asymmetric-trust
problem. In a client-server scenario where multiple clients are relying on
the same server, a badly intended partition could jeopardize the correct
functioning of their concurrent partitions. To avoid these type of scenarios,
a timeout strategy could be implemented. However [HE16] tells us that the
timeout method is useless for DoS attacks, either because of wrong user
implementation, or simply because there is no scientific or measurable way
of determining an appropriate timeout value, which usually leads to timeout
values of either zero or infinite.
• Asynchronous communication or non-blocking communication or event-
based communication: Contrary to synchronous communication, in asyn-
chronous communication the partitions do not meet at a specific moment,
thus eliminating blockage in any of the partitions. This method of com-
munication is usually paired with a separate event mechanism to notify the
receiving partition that there is a new message to be received [RN93]. This
separation between data and event channels allows the partitions to be ex-
ecuting while waiting for a message or a message response. However, this
type of policy can induce kernel buffering and consequently, an additional
data copy.
When paired with an event mechanism however, which usually is the case
for a complete IPC mechanism, this asynchronous communication method is
still prone to DoS attacks, as one partition can flood the other with message
events, preventing its correct functioning [LIJ97].
Concerning the IPC mechanism’s data channel, these can be divided into:
• Shared Memory: This method consists on having a block of allocated
memory which multiple partitions on the system can have access to, as a way
of serving as the data channel for the IPC mechanism. It is a more efficient
but less secure policy, as it needs to allocate a block of memory accessible
by more than a single partition, making it an easy target for buffer-overflow
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attacks [GKS94]. A bunch of strategies could be implemented to circumvent
such problem, mainly with an access control strategy supported by a kind
of execution privilege level.
Although most systems implement their own design of a shared memory
IPC mechanism, more and more solutions are using the VirtIO technology
standard. In [PGLA15, OMC+18] are shown different ways of using the
VirtIO interface, which will be explained later in further detail.
• Direct Transfer: Copies data directly between send and receive buffers,
thus reducing an extra copy from the shared memory approach [DPNJ08].
This entails that a dedicated kernel module [JSCP05] is responsible for mes-
sage passing between the system’s partitions, incurring necessary system
calls and overall overhead.
Finally, all different approaches need to take into account the IPC destination.
More traditional IPC mechanisms, e.g. the original L4 mechanism, used threads as
destinations for IPC operations. Thus, a malicious entity could gather information
from the system, e.g., to create an effective attack [EH13, LIJ97]. To counter such
threat, the concept of endpoint was introduced, providing an abstraction layer for
the communication mechanism where messages can be read or written.
In further sections, this document will present more in-depth expositions of
more IPC standards and specific IPC mechanisms of established OSes and hyper-
visors that relate to this thesis’ work.
2.1.4.2 Hardware-assisted IPC
In recent years, there has been a surge of hardware-accelerated IPC mecha-
nisms. These usually consist of modified, standard communication mechanisms
with hardware accelerators for data transfers. These mechanisms have emerged
from the need of improving IPC performance and security without increasing soft-
ware overhead. As mentioned before, the IPC mechanism is of utter importance
in a critical embedded system, and having it migrated to hardware, even if only
a small percentage of the whole mechanism, can greatly decrease communication
overhead and help guaranteeing time-critical tasks.
Some solutions implement DMA-based (Direct Memory Access) memory copies,
as it can access memory independently of the CPU, and thus accelerate these
transactions. Projects such as [YBYW10, DPNJ08] make use of DMA to aid in
communication performance. In [YBYW10, ABYY10] we learnt that there may
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be some inherit problems on making use of DMA-based transfers for IPC mech-
anisms for virtualized systems. The first problem mentioned in [ABYY10] is the
intentional or unintentional access to memory regions that an untrusted device
is not allowed to access. Secondly, DMA might be unsuitable for use in virtual-
ization environments by guest partitions, since these guests, do not usually know
host-physical addresses and the device is unaware of guest-physical address spaces.
Lastly, some legacy devices do not support long addresses and therefore cannot
access the entire physical memory. [YBYW10] shows us how an I/O Memory
Management Unit (IOMMU) can be used to solve most of these problems, but
also the subsequent overhead caused by mapping (and unmapping if done during
runtime). It follows by suggesting a basic set of rules that any DMA mapping
scheme must satisfy: the DMA device must have all guest physical addresses ac-
cessed mapped in its IOMMU translation table; every mapping in a given device’s
IOMMU translation table must have a corresponding mapping in the CPU MMU
translation table for the Guest using that device; every DMA-accessed address
must me mapped both as guest-physical address and corresponding host-physical
address. Furthermore, [SG12] proves that it is possible to make use of DMA-based
memory transfers in a virtualized environment without making use of additional
hardware, i.e. a dedicated IOMMU, only using a standard MMU.
Other solutions however, implement dedicated hardware accelerators instead
of using DMA-based communication strategies. Dedicated hardware accelera-
tors in FPGA SoCs are not new to the computing world, being used as early
as the year of 1963 [EBTB63]. Reconfigurable computing sits in the middle of
the hardware-based Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) and software
solutions, combining the much higher performance of ASICs with the flexibility
of software [CH02]. From matrix multiplication [DFK+07] and matrix floating-
point computation [KGG06], to solving of complex imaging algorithms [Zem02],
hardware-programmable alternatives have been explored in a myriad of different
ways. So, as long as FPGA-enabled SoCs were small enough to be used for embed-
ded systems solutions, hardware-acceleration has been used alongside it. Regard-
ing IPC mechanisms, hardware accelerators have been used to reduce overhead
induced especially by the memory copies, although almost-complete hardware-
based IPC mechanisms have been implemented. One of these implementations is
the in-house Message Passing Management Unit (MPMU) [GGM+16].
However, using a dedicated hardware peripheral for IPC can also be a danger-
ous task, if not taken care of. The same problems of buffer overflow and memory
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attacks can still happen if unregulated, and it is up to the system designer tak-
ing these problems into consideration and either make use of memory manager
peripherals to arbitrate memory copies, or implement a reliable hardware-based
IPC mechanism that follows the aforementioned rules.
In further chapters we will discuss how these problems are avoided or even
solved, either by the underlying hardware and software platforms used for this
project, or this project’s work itself.
2.1.5 VirtIO
With the various possible Linux virtualization systems, and with all of them
having major differences in driver features and optimizations, there was a dire
need for a solution that brought all of them together while simplifying the driver
implementation and maintenance process. To achieve a standard solution, VirtIO
emerged as the answer, consisting on a series of Linux drivers which can be adapted
for various different hypervisor implementations by using an abstraction layer
[Rus08]. Although initially only intended for Linux, VirtIO was later added to
bare-metal and RTOS Guests by the OpenAMP project [BR16].
VirtIO project set out to achieve three basic goals: eliminate third-party in-
terference in the Linux Kernel; create a common ABI for general publication and
use of buffers; use their own virtio_ring infrastructure and the Linux API for
virtual I/O devices for device probing and configuration. Ultimately, the project
achieved its desired goals, with VirtIO successfully representing an abstract layer
that provides a set of front-end and back-end para-virtualization drivers in order
to ease the complexity of emulating a given device [OMC+18].
The goal was to create a transport abstraction layer capable of bringing efficient
transport mechanisms to all virtual devices. To achieve that, VirtIO drivers start
by registering themselves with the device type, and optionally, with the vendor
name. Then, these virtual devices can be configured with a few operations, the
first of them being reading and writing the necessary feature bits. The device will
look for feature bits of specific device types that correspond to features it wants to
use. This feature bit acknowledgement is known by both the guest and the driver.
The second operation, reading and writing the configuration space, consists on
configuring a structure containing information from the virtual device, which can
be both read and written by the guest. In the third possible configuration, VirtIO
will set and get an 8 bit device status word which the guest uses to indicate the
status of the device probing operations. Lastly, the device reset operation is able
to reset the device, its configuration and all its status bits.
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Figure 2.5: Virtqueue Circular Buffers
The most performance critical part of the API however, is the I/O mechanism
itself, and not the configuration mechanism itself. As such, VirtIO implements
virtqueues, created by a configuration operation (find_vq) when given the specific
VirtIO device and the desired index number, being possible for a device to have
multiple virtqueues (usually one for each input and output). This virtqueues are
queues where guests write scatter-gather array buffers to be read by the host. The
virtqueue operations structure consists of: an add_buf call to add a new buffer to
the queue, which is complemented with the kick directive to notify the receiving
end that a new buffer was added; a get_buf call to get a used buffer, returning the
length of the buffer written by the counterpart; enable_cb and disable_cb (enable
and disable callback) used to enable or disable the callback, which is equivalent
to enabling or disabling a device interruption.
Regarding the transport layer itself, previous virtual device implementations
were designed to leverage a multi-guest (specifically more than two) mechanism.
To improve performance, VirtIO ditches this more versatile but slower I/O mech-
anism for an higher-throughput simpler mechanism, based on a standard method
of high-speed I/O: ringbuffers [BDF+03]. VirtIO names its own mechanism as vir-
tio_ring, consisting of: a descriptor array that can only be written by the master,
containing buffer descriptions with length, address and additional flags; an "avail-
able" ring that also can only be written by the master, where the guest indicates
what descriptors buffer arrays are ready to be used; an "used" ring which can only
be written by the slave, where the host indicates which buffer arrays are used and
ready to be recycled [Rus08]. Figure 2.5 depicts how the three buffer arrays relate
to each other, where the descriptor is represented as a circular buffer containing
information about both the used and available arrays.
VirtIO has a myriad of currently implemented drivers in many different device
categories. One of these devices is the RPMsg device, a VirtIO-based messaging










Figure 2.6: Virtualization Use-Case for RPMsg as IPC
bus that allows kernel drivers to communicate with remote processors available on
the system. As such, RPMsg was naturally used for Inter-Core Communication
strategies, but later adapted to be used as the transport layer of an Inter-VM
communication mechanism. The normally back-end and front-end drivers are
converted into master and slave communication drivers, respectively [OMC+18].
Although VirtIO enables bidirectional transport layers, RPMsg creates two sepa-
rate unidirectional channels to achieve the bidirectional communication, as a way
of better isolating communication. This way, it is possible for guests to enable
one-sided notifications and be notified for the operations that they wish to be
notified. This allows for both sides of the communication RPMsg channel to start
the communication, as long as the master previously made the necessary configu-
rations.
An IPC mechanism using the RPMsg communication protocol constitutes an
asynchronous, shared-memory communication mechanism comprised of RPMsg
Channels with the possibility of having multiple RPMsg Endpoints, containing
their own address and callback routine. Also, being an asynchronous communi-
cation mechanism, it needs a separate event channel for notifications. Figure 2.6
represents a general use-case for using VirtIO and RPMsg as Inter-VM Commu-
nication, where both OSes can act as both master and slave to send and receive
messages. Usually, the hypervisor will handle the event channel, notifying the
guests as needed.
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2.2 Related Work
As mentioned before, systems usually employ many different IPC implemen-
tations depending on the desired use and their own characteristics. Here are
represented some essential for this project, either by employing similar features or
by being important for overall project scope.
2.2.1 L4 Microkernel’s IPC
First, we start by presenting an IPC mechanism implementation that is not too
similar to the project at hands, but one whose generic implementation principles
are followed by our mechanism. This implementation is the L4 microkernel and
its IPC mechanism, as well as some of its later adaptations.
The original L4 microkernel, evolved from an earlier system, the L3 microkernel
[Lie93a], which featured slow IPC performance with overhead costs on the order
of the one-hundred microseconds [HE16]. [Lie93b] tries to tackle the issue of
IPC for microkernel designs that severely lacked in performance and consequently
overall system efficiency. Such issue that even led some to completely abandon the
microkernel approach, since, as aforementioned, IPC is a fundamental component
of any system, and an even more crucial one in microkernel designs. So, L4
follows an "IPC performance is the master" principle, keeping a strong focus on
the performance of IPC operations, while still maintaining to the principle of
minimal implementation. This principle, combined with the aim of generality, is
still followed by each and every one of the modern L4 implementations.
L4 implemented a synchronous message-passing IPC mechanism to avoid buffer-
ing in the kernel and the management and copying cost associated with it [EH13].
This method works just fine in the original L4 implementation and on single-core
systems of that time, since combining the context switch with communication
minimises overheads. However, with the introduction of multi-core systems, a
synchronous message passing mechanism became obsolete. As such, modern L4
versions added semaphore-like notifications to the original L4 IPC mechanism, ei-
ther completely ditching the synchronous design (OKL4 implements virtual IRQs
[HL10]) or maintaining the synchronous design and adding the notification mech-
anism. Regarding the message structure itself, there were not many modifications
done, being the most notable the abandonment of "long" IPC messages, specially in
small, resource-critical embedded systems. More prominent, is the introduction of
port-like endpoints [KEH+09], a strategy introduced to replace the older "threads
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as the targets of IPC operations" [HE16]. Further, less relevant, modifications
include:
• Removal of IPC timeouts to be replaced by a single flag to configure as
polling or blocking mechanisms. [Sha03]
• Abandonment of the original assembly code for the higher-level C code.
• Replacement of some physical message registers with virtual message regis-
ters.
2.2.2 MINIX’s IPC
Similar to the IPC mechanism from the previous section, our implementation
takes inspiration from the general principles of the MINIX’s IPC system, rather
than its design choices and structure.
Besides being fundamental in terms of performance and efficiency of most sys-
tems, the IPC mechanism must be dependable for the whole system to also be
dependable, and that entails new concerns in the security and safety departments,
as this means that such mechanism has to be aware of not only self-threats, bugs
and other programming mishaps, but also threats from untrusted code on un-
trusted system partitions. In [TGB+08], the MINIX system makes their case on
the need for dependability of the IPC mechanism on a modular system that re-
lies indiscriminately on it, as untrusted application and drivers make use of the
mechanism, and should not be able to affect the rest of the system.
MINIX defines an IPC threat as an "unintended IPC action that originates in
a buggy component and that may disrupt the core operating system" and follows
by identifying an assortment of IPC threats, divided into three classes:
• the IPC Subsystem itself: some exceptional IPC requests can potentially be
used as attacks on the mechanism itself, either by invalid call parameters
(invalid IPC primitive, message buffer, endpoints, etc.), or by the misuse of
global resources.
• Message Delivery: regarding source and destination addresses (unauthorized
access, wrong device, spoofing) or either the message content itself (oversized
messages in dynamic payloads) .
• Group Interactions with untrusted processes: untrusted partitions can affect
IPC flow control (scheduling problems and DoS attacks) and block other
system partitions, even trusted, more privileged ones, if badly designed.
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MINIX also presents an extended version of the Asymmetric Trust Model,
including both untrusted clients and servers as possible threats.
To deal with the identified threats, the MINIX 3 IPC mechanism followed an
asynchronous and non-blocking nature. MINIX also implements endpoints tied to
a single IPC process. The IPC message itself is small and of fixed-length, with a
fixed message header containing an endpoint and the message type. Furthermore,
MINIX implements a set of restrictions to the IPC mechanism to better control
the untrusted partitions that make use of IPC.
With these policies, adding a few extra cautions, MINIX’s system is capable
of being threat-resistant, self-reliable and dependable, which should be ideal for
any safety critical system.
2.2.3 On-Chip Message Passing Mechanism for IPC
A good example of an hardware-based IPC mechanism is the in-house IPC
mechanism presented in [GGM+16]. The Message Passing Management Unit
(MPMU) is an all-hardware IPC mechanism deployed in an in-house SoC based
on an ARM-compliant softcore processor.
This DMA-capable MPMU is connected as a memory-mapped peripheral. At
system boot, the hypervisor configures the number of partitions, desired commu-
nication mode, and which memory addresses it reserved for MPMU use. Then,
each partition configures the MPMU with the addresses of its input and output
buffers within its own address space [GGM+16]. This prior configuration, enables
a fast communication mechanism, as there is no need for additional information
exchanges during runtime. When a partition intends to send a message, it signals
the MPMU, which, in turn, uses the pre-configured memory addresses to make a
direct copy to the desired partition. Also, being hardware implemented, means
that the hypervisor has no need of interfering in the IPC transfer. Furthermore,
this mechanism is user-transparent and, from the guest’s view, the only performed
action was a write to a memory location. There are some trade-offs however, for
this hardware implementation, such as an added hardware and memory costs in
trade for the better latency in communication, as well as a fixed-buffer message
size in trade for less software overhead.
Our implementation takes inspiration on the MPMU hardware IPC mecha-
nism for its performance benefits, specially data throughput and latency decrease,
but will not implement the whole of the mechanism in reconfigurable hardware.
Instead, the more performance critical tasks will be offloaded to hardware while
maintaining some software configurations. More on this will be explained further.










Figure 2.7: Use-Case for Virtual Devices as IPC
2.2.4 Virtual Device-based IPC
The following section shortly describes a series of hypervisors that make use of
device I/O virtualization strategies to implement shared memory IPC mechanisms.
Figure 2.7 represents the general use-case when using a shared-memory ap-
proach with the aid of virtual I/O devices as interface. Many implementations
also include a separate event path, either in the hypervisor layer, or as another
I/O device.
2.2.4.1 Xen’s IPC
The Xen hypervisor, presented in [BDF+03], is a multi-guest OS hypervisor
capable of hosting up to one-hundred virtual machines. This hypervisor has been
explored extensively and is even featured in aviation applications, after being
modified to follow the ARINC 653 standard [CI06]. This standard consists on a
partitioning method that reduces development costs, reduces system weight, and
lowers certification costs by consolidating several applications on one computing
resource, yet keeping them isolated [Van10, LLK08].
The main control mechanism for the high-level issues of the Xen hypervisor is
the Domain 0 partition. One of the many tasks of this domain 0 is to handle device
I/O virtualization. It is also through this mechanism that Xen implements its IPC
communication strategy. Like RPMsg in VirtIO, Xen implements unidirectional
circular ring buffers via shared memory mechanisms at kernel level, through the
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Dom 0 partition. This communication is used for accessing hardware devices, as
well as communication between Guest VMs.
2.2.4.2 SASP’s IPC
SASP, or Secure Automotive Software Platform, is a project that implements
a dual-OS TrustZone-based hypervisor (V-Monitor) with a specialized TrustZone-
assisted device access mechanism. This mechanism restricts the GPOS from di-
rectly accessing system devices.
V-Monitor makes use of this mechanism to implement shared-memory IPC,
starting by having the GPOS in the normal world making a device access request,
followed by the context switch to the secure world after V-Monitor is notified,
which will then copy the desired data.
2.2.4.3 SafeG’s IPC
SafeG, or Safety Gate [SHT10], is a dual-OS TrustZone-assisted hypervisor
supporting integrated scheduling, strategy which, SafeG claims, enhances the
responsiveness of the GPOS while not affecting the determinism of the RTOS.
SafeG’s biggest claim is its health monitoring mechanism present on the RTOS,
SafeG monitor, capable of suspending, resuming and restarting the operation of
the GPOS. This is possible due to TrustZone’s design: the secure world can access
and has more privilege than the non-secure world.
As for device sharing, SafeG follows a re-partitioning approach which consists
on "dynamically modifying the assignment of devices to each OS at run time"
[SHT12]. This approach reduces overhead as it allows both OSes accessing the de-
vices directly. Two different re-partitioning mechanisms are implemented in SafeG:
pure re-partitioning, consisting on the dynamical re-partition of devices between
the guest OSes, similar to hotplugging; hybrid re-partitioning, eliminating the need
of device resetting at each device partition switch, as some of the configurations
will be maintained throughout the system execution, and others, the necessary
ones, will change when switched between secure and non-secure partitions.
As for its communication mechanism, dualoscom [SHT13], SafeG implements
a shared-memory communication mechanism at user-space level, but it allows for
untrusted, privileged applications to manage this shared memory block, which
poses as a safety concern, with potentially allowing untrusted, unprivileged ap-
plications from accessing this shared memory. Like VirtIO-based communication
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mechanisms, dualoscom also makes use of virtual I/O, as well as dividing commu-
nications into data and event path. However, it does not implement a standard
interface.
2.2.4.4 Rodosvisor’s IPC
Rodosvisor [TDL+12] is an in-house ARINC 653 Quasi-compliant hypervisor
supporting multiple VMs. As well as other aforementioned hypervisors, Rodosvi-
sor implements virtual I/O devices. Also, it relies on this virtual I/O for inter-VM
communication, with an inter-VM framework deployed as a part of the hypervi-
sor’s CCommManager.
The shared-memory communication mechanism features:
• Binding communications unidirectional channels.
• Hypercalls for: channel creation, mapping and unmapping; send and receive
data; start and end execution.
• Slave VM monitoring.

3. Platform and Tools
This chapter will present the research platform and tools used for the develop-
ment of this project. Some of these were project requirements, while others were
carefully chosen to meet the criteria imposed by the project scope. It starts by
presenting the Zynq SoC ZYBO board and why this was the chosen hardware plat-
form, along with an in-depth look at the more relevant components. Following, is a
detailed exposition on the hypervisor used in this project, the in-house LTZVisor,
as well as the IPC mechanism later added to this hypervisor, the TZ-VirtIO.
3.1 Zynq Platform
To correctly make a decision on the hardware platform used in this project, we
must first evaluate the requirements as to complete this project. The identified
requirements were:
1. The chosen platform must be able to support the open-source LTZVisor
software, more specifically:
• include a Cortex-A series ARM processor;
• the ARM processor must provide hardware-assisted virtualization fa-
cilities;
• TrustZone-enabled ARM SoC.
2. The chosen platform must be able to run GPOSes.
3. The chosen platform must include integrated FPGA logic supporting Trust-
Zone hardware extensions.
4. The chosen platform must include DMA-capable memory and peripherals
supporting TrustZone technology.
5. The chosen platform must be cost-effective to achieve the desired goals.
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Figure 3.1: Zynq-7000 AP SoC Overview
To meet the first requirement, as well as its more specific constraints, we could
check the LTZVisor’s GitHub repository and verify the three currently supported
boards by the LTZVisor project. These three SoCs, all from the same Zynq-7000
family, are all able to run the LTZVisor as it stands, providing hardware-assisted
virtualization facilities and TrustZone security extensions. In fact, they meet
all of the technical requirements that follow, as the ARMv7-A specification is
complemented by an integrated MMU, and they all present FPGA and DMA
capabilities. To finally reach a conclusion, we must choose the most cost-effective
solution. This leaves us with the ZYBO SoC, the most affordable of the three
options while still capable of achieving the goals set for this thesis.
The now retired ZYBO, produced by Digilent, is the smallest member of the
Xilinx’s Zynq-7000 family of SoCs based on the Xilinx All Programmable SoC
architecture [Xil16, Figure 3.1]. It is divided into the SoCs Processing System (PS)
side and the Programmable Logic (PL) side. The PS includes a dual-core ARM
Cortex-A9 processor as the Application Processor Unit’s (APU) main component.
This processor includes 32 KB of instruction and data L1 caches per core and 512
KB of core-shareable L2 cache with a dedicated Snoop Control Unit (SCU) to
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maintain cache coherency. The APU also features an Accelerator Coherency Port
(ACP) to bridge the PS and PL sides, 256 KB of dual-ported on-chip SRAM (also
referred to as OCM (On-Chip Memory)), an 8-channel DMA controller (4 channels
for each SoC side) and a General Interrupt Controller (GIC). To interface with
the 512 MB of out-of-chip DDR3 memory, a DDR Controller is included in the
PS side. As for the rest of the I/O peripherals included in the PS, these include
a GPIO, two up-to 1 Gigabit Ethernet controllers, two USB 2.0 Controllers, two
SD controllers, two SPI controllers, two CAN Controllers, two UART Controllers
and two I2C Controllers.
Finally, the PL side features a total of 28,000 logic cells, 240 KB of fast block
RAM, 80 DSP slices and a Xilinx’s own dual 12 bit Analog-to-Digital Converter.
To bridge both sides of the chip, there are a set of nine AXI interfaces including
four 32-bit General Purpose AXI interfaces suitable for low-bandwidth PS-PL or
PL-PS communications, four High-Performance AXI interfaces capable of burst
transactions all mastered by the PL side, and an ACP interface between the PL
and the SCU for cache coherency between APU and PL.
3.1.1 DMA
One of the most important hardware components for the development of this
thesis is the DMA Controller (DMAC) present on the ZYBO. The DMAC uses
a 64-bit AXI bus to transfer data between memory, from memory to peripherals
and vice-versa, and between peripherals [Xil16, Figure 3.2]. To use the DMAC,
the programmer stores the program code for the DMA engine, written in its own
instruction set, to a region of system memory, which the DMAC will then access
through its master AXI interface. This small instruction set, comprising of in-
structions for DMA transfers and management instructions to control the system,
provides great flexibility for the system designer.
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Figure 3.2: DMAC Channels
The controller is able to run eight simultaneous DMA channels, and as such,
capable of moving big amounts of data without processor intervention. All of
the memory and memory-mapped peripherals are within reach for this DMAC.
Furthermore, the DMAC has two sets of control and status registers, one for the
secure mode and another for the non-secure mode, thus guaranteeing physical sep-
aration between modes, as there can be no mixing between secure and non-secure
created channels. To change the security status of the DMAC, the System-Level
Control Registers (SLCR) should be used, which requires an hardware controller
reset to take effect.
3.1.2 AXI
The Advanced eXtensible Interface, AXI for short, is the third generation of
the Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture, AMBA3, an interconnect speci-
fication describing the connection and management of functional blocks in a SoC
[ARM11]. AXI Full enables high-performance transferring of data between sys-
tem’s partitions, supporting burst transactions of up to 256 data transfers in each
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burst, that allow write or read operations on sequentially addressed locations by
only having issued the first address and the number of desired operations. There is
also a subset of the AXI protocol, the AXI4-Lite specification, with a simpler con-
trol interface, but with much less throughput than its bigger sibling, only allowing
one data transfer per transaction.
The AXI protocol defines a set of control and data transmission channels,
which consist of: read address, write address, read data, write data and write
response. Figure 3.3 demonstrates how the mechanics of an AXI Full read and
write transactions work with visual representation of the aforementioned channels.
In a read operation, the master interface will, through the "read address chan-
nel", send the address it is trying to read along with other control signals, followed
by the response of the slave interface, which should send the read data through
the "read data channel".
On a write transaction, the master interface will send the address and control
signals through the "write data channel" followed by the data to be written through
the "write data channel". The slave interface will then respond through the "write
response channel" sending a signal to signify the end of transaction.
This separation between channels enables simultaneous bidirectional transac-
tions.
On the ZYBO, AXI is the central protocol used to connect every component
on the board, as we can see in Figure 3.4. The physical AMBA Interconnect bus
connects the various devices and peripherals using the AXI protocol, with a mix
of AXI4-Full and AXI4-Lite protocols, depending on the needed data-throughput
through the bus. In the PS side, these buses are used to connect the APU to
the external peripherals, as well as to the DRAM. To connect between PL and
PS sides, there are four General Purpose AXI ports, using AXI4-Lite protocol,
and four High Performance AXI ports, using AXI4-Full protocol. There is also
Figure 3.3: AXI Read/Write Transactions
34 Chapter 3. Platform and Tools
Figure 3.4: ZYBO SoC Overview
the possibility of using AXI Interconnect buses in the PL to connect between
hardware modules.
3.2 LTZVisor
The software platform used in this project was the in-house open-source Trust-
Zone-assisted Hypervisor, the LTZVisor, with its later implemented dual-OS Virt-
IO-based IPC mechanism, the TZ-VirtIO. This section describes both, and how
they are relevant for the practical work of this thesis.
3.2.1 Overview
The LTZVisor [PPG+17], is an open-source lightweight TrustZone-assisted hy-
pervisor created as a software platform to enable exploration of how TrustZone
hardware extensions can be used in the aid of virtualization. To make the most
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Figure 3.5: LTZVisor General Architecture
out of TrustZone hardware extensions as virtualization assistance, the LTZVisor
follows three simple principles:
• principle of minimal implementation, relying on TrustZone technology for
virtualization as much as possible, and diminishing the system’s TCB, thus
reducing the attack surface area;
• principle of least privilege, where resource access is given to components
when absolutely necessary (TrustZone’s separation by design helps greatly
with this principle);
• principle of asymmetric scheduling, giving the critical secure side higher priv-
ilege of execution than the non-secure side ensures that timing requirements
are met.
LTZVisor makes use of TrustZone’s two virtual execution environments to host
the privileged software in the secure world, while the non-secure world hosts the
non-privileged software. The LTZVisor itself runs in monitor mode, the highest
privileged processor mode available, where the processor state is always considered
secure. In this state, the LTZVisor has full control over the system’s resources and
because of that, it is responsible for configuring the needed underlying devices for
VM usage, as well as overall management of physical resources for the VMs. This
includes managing the Virtual Machine Control Block (VMCB) of each VM at a
partition switch, transferring the VM state previously saved in the VMCB to the
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current processor context, and saving back to the VMCB the previous processor
state.
Also running in secure mode is the secure VM which, unlike the monitor mode
for the LTZVisor, is executing in a lower privileged level: the supervisor mode. Be-
cause of TrustZone’s design, when executing in the secure state, the processor has
the ability of viewing the non-secure side, and thus interfere with the non-secure
VM. So, the OS running on the secure world will make part of the LTZVisor’s
TCB. Also, the fact that it is running at an higher privilege mode than the non-
secure side, means that the secure side is the perfect candidate for hosting the
RTOS, with the higher privilege level helping on meeting time constraints. Fi-
nally, the GPOS will be run in supervisor mode in the non-secure world. This
VM is completely isolated from the secure world (secure VM and LTZVisor) and,
because it is running in a high privilege mode but not on the secure world, it
cannot access any component on the secure world side. Figure 3.5 shows the gen-
eral architecture of the LTZVisor including the partition of respective worlds and
modes.
3.2.2 Virtual CPU
By design, TrustZone technology divides each physical CPU core into two
virtual CPUs, one for each execution world. Also, to help with reducing the
number of registers to be saved and restored in each partition-switch, there is
one physical register bank for each world, however different from each other. The
secure side’s VMCB is comprised of 16 banked registers, consisting on 13 General
Purpose Registers, and three Control registers: Stack Pointer (SP), Linker Register
(LR) and Saved Program Status Register (SPSR) for the System Mode. On the
non-secure world, the VMCB is composed of 25 registers that also encompass 13
General Purpose Registers, but only one SP, one LR and one SPSR for each of the
Supervisor, System, Abort and Undefined modes. Not included are the 5 higher
General Purpose Registers as well as the Stack Pointer, Linker Register and Saved
Program Status Register for both the IRQ and FIQ modes, as these are world
exclusive. Furthermore, the Monitor mode is, by design, uniquely dedicated to
the secure world side. Almost all of the coprocessor registers are banked, only the
System Control Register (SCTLR) and the Auxiliary Control Register (ACTLR)
need to be preserved.
Regarding the unbanked registers, and because TrustZone’s design does not
allow for the non-secure world to read them, can only be read but not written
when the processor is in the non-secure state, as every attempt to write them










Figure 3.6: LTZVisor Memory Configuration for the ZC702 Board
will be ignored. This causes a problem for the non-secure OS, as some of these
registers are needed for some hardware component setup, thus leading to a block
in the non-secure GPOS boot process when these registers are attempted to be
modified. To avoid this, LTZVisor fills some registers of the non-secure VMCB
with the needed initialization values.
3.2.3 Scheduler
Virtualizing a real-time environment can be problematic, especially when an
hypervisor schedules virtual CPUs, while a guest RTOS running over the virtual
CPU schedules its own time-critical tasks. This causes an hierarchical scheduling
problem, since ensuring that real-time tasks running on a virtual CPU and that
both schedulers are designed to make sure the time constraints are met, requires
a complex hierarchical scheduling analysis.
To avoid this problem, LTZVisor implements an asymmetric scheduling pol-
icy, thus guaranteeing that the non-secure GPOS is only scheduled during the idle
periods of the secure RTOS. This way, the RTOS maintains an higher schedul-
ing priority than the GPOS and is in fact the software component in charge of
scheduling the VMs. This however, does not leave full control of the software stack
to the secure RTOS, as the LTZVisor still runs at an higher privilege level.
3.2.4 Memory Partition
As aforementioned, TrustZone-enabled SoCs only provide MMU support for
single-level address translation, and because traditional hardware-assisted virtual-
ization relies on support for two-level address translation, a different strategy had










Figure 3.7: LTZVisor Memory Configuration for the ZYBO Board
to be used for mapping the guests virtual memory to host physical memory. As
such, LTZVisor makes use of the TZASC to guarantee spatial isolation between
the non-secure guest and the secure one. TZASC enables the partition of memory
into different segments, and then allows setting those partitions to be configured
as secure or non-secure. This does not allow for the non-secure world to access
memory partitions configured as secure and, if the non-secure OS tries to access a
secure memory address, an exception will be triggered and execution control will
be redirected to the hypervisor.
Naturally, LTZVisor configures a bigger portion of the available memory as
non-secure for the GPOS, as its memory footprint is much bigger than the com-
bined secure RTOS and the hypervisor. Because memory regions can be configured
with a granularity of 64MB, LTZVisor originally configures 960MB of memory, di-
vided into fifteen 64MB memory segments (from 0x00000000 0x3BFF_FFFF).
The remaining 64MB of memory are configured as secure for the hypervisor and
the secure VM (from 0x3C00_0000 0x3FFF_FFFF). Figure 3.6 depicts memory
configuration and partitions on the ZC702 board.
The original LTZVisor implementation however, was tested on the Xilinx
ZC702 board which was endowed with 1GB of DRAM. As the ZYBO only has
512MB of DRAM, some alterations to the original ZC702 configuration were
needed. Because memory segment granularity is of 64MB, the size of the se-
cure partition could not be altered and the only remaining solution was reducing
the size of the non-secure partition. The final configuration consisted on 448MB
(from 0x00000000 0x1BFF_FFFF) for the non-secure partition and the remain-
ing 64MB (from 0x1C00_0000 0x1FFF_FFFF) for the secure partition (Figure
3.7).
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3.2.5 MMU and Cache
The MMU present on the Zynq-7000 SoC is TrustZone-aware, and although it
does not allow for two-level address translation, it does enable each world to have
its own set of virtual-to-physical memory address translation tables. This method
reduces overhead at the time of a partition-switch, as translation lookaside buffer
entries do not need to be invalidated.
As aforementioned, at cache level, the same world separation still applies.
However, the NS bit is set by hardware and not accessible by system software.
This means that there is no need for a cache flush at the time of a world-switch,
greatly improving the LTZVisor’s performance, since no cache operation needs to
be performed by the software and cache management is handled by TrustZone’s
design. Furthermore, and because any attempt to enable or disable the L2 cache
from the non-secure world side will be ignored (again, due to TrustZone’s design),
LTZVisor needs to enable both L1 and L2 caches before the non-secure GPOS
starts booting.
3.2.6 Devices
TrustZone technologies also allows devices to be configured as secure or non-
secure, thus extending world isolation to the device-level. LTZVisor makes use of
this feature by configuring the devices during boot time to the desired security
world, and then implementing a pass-through policy, where devices can be accessed
directly by the VMs. The devices will be configured as secure to be only used by the
RTOS or and exceptionally by the hypervisor itself and so, triggering an exception
handled by the hypervisor anytime the GPOS tries to access these devices. The
devices that are intended to be used by the non-secure GPOS should, during boot
time, be configured as non-secure, thus allowing for the non-secure world to access
them.
3.2.7 Interrupt Management
TrustZone-enabled SoCs allow for both secure and non-secure interrupt sources
to coexist, and also support for secure interrupts to be configured with an higher
priority level than that of non-secure interrupts. Furthermore, both IRQs and
FIQs can be configured to secure or non-secure interrupt sources.
LTZVisor, by design, configures interrupts coming from secure devices as FIQs
and non-secure interrupts as IRQs. This is possible because the on-board GIC is
TrustZone-aware and allows for all interrupts to be individually defined as secure












































Figure 3.8: Interrupt Handling in LTZVisor
or non-secure, through the Interrupt Security Registers set (ICDISRn). To be
able to use the processor’s FIQ mechanism, the FIQen bit in the CPU Interface
Control Register (ICPICR) must be set. Furthermore, LTZVisor configures FIQs
to be redirected directly to the RTOS without hypervisor assistance (even if the
GPOS is currently executing), thus guaranteeing that no overhead is added to
the interrupt latency of the secure guest OS. IRQs on the other hand, configured
to be handled by the GPOS, do not affect the normal functioning of the RTOS,
even if the interrupt happens when the secure VM is currently executing. Instead,
the IRQ will be processed and handled as soon as the non-secure guest becomes
active. Moreover, setting FIQs and IRQs to be handled by the secure world and
non-secure world, respectively, prevents DoS attacks from the GPOS against the
secure world. Figure 3.8 depicts LTZVisor’s interrupt handling strategies for the
various possible scenarios. In Figure 3.8a is shown how FIQ’s are handled in
the cases where RTOS and GPOS are executing. Figure 3.8b also depicts how
LTZVisor handles interrupt for both running OSes, but this time for an IRQ.
3.2.8 TZ-VirtIO
Not included in the open-source version of the LTZVisor is the TZ-VirtIO, a
VirtIO-based IPC mechanism. By using this VirtIO-based mechanism, LTZVisor
intends to use a standard solution for Inter-VM communication, thus making use
of later RPMsg adaptations to follow the latest trends in virtualization strategies,
but modified for this open-source TrustZone-based hypervisor.
TZ-VirtIO implements an adaptation of the RPMsg API provided by Texas
Instrument and OpenAMP for Linux and FreeRTOS VMs respectively. In Figure
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Figure 3.9: TZ-VirtIO Generic Architecture
3.9 is depicted the general architecture of the TZ-VirtIO IPC mechanism in the
LTZVisor, including both RPMsg virtual devices and its VirtIO abstraction, as
well as the data and event paths, and the user-space communication apps.
As aforementioned, this kind of IPC mechanism is of an asynchronous, shared-
memory nature, and thus, it makes use of a non-secure block of memory for the
transport layer (data path). This non-secure memory block is configured at com-
pile time and statically allocated at boot-time. It is configured by the TZASC
as non-secure so that both secure and non-secure worlds can access it. Although
VirtIO allows for both the RTOS and GPOS to be the communication master,
because the master is responsible for setting up the shared memory at boot-time
and consequently the initial organisation of the VirtIO buffers, this task should
fall on the more privileged secure OS to help insuring the isolation.
As for the notification mechanism, LTZVisor differs from other TrustZone-
assisted trusted execution environment, since most of them implement a Remote
Procedure Call (RPC) mechanism featuring SMC instructions for the notification
events. However, this implementation does not suit the LTZVisor, as it requires
an immediate world switch and consequent interrupt handling, which would not
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be ideal, since the GPOS should not interfere with the secure RTOS to not jeopar-
dise the real-time guarantees [OMC+18]. Instead, TZ-VirtIO makes use of Inter-
Processor Interrupts (IPIs) to implement the inter-partition notifications of the
RPMsg event path. However, because TrustZone technology blocks, by design,
the non-secure world from interrupting the more privileged secure one, the direct
triggering of an IPI was replaced by an interrupt request to the hypervisor via
an SMC instruction, which forces an immediate switch to the monitor mode and
subsequently entailing a slight increase in the partition-switching time. To cir-
cumvent this problem, the hypervisor will store the interrupt request in a circular
buffer, which will be used to trigger the IPI to the respective OS during the next
context-switch. This storing mechanism will prevent the GPOS from interrupting
the time-critical RTOS.
Finally, because all of TZ-VirtIO resources are allocated statically, including
the shared memory region and VirtIOs shared memory control data, this gives it
the ability of being memory fault proof, thus preventing any unwanted access to
out-of-bounds memory regions. This will reveal itself to be quite an useful feature
later on.
4. hTZ-VirtIO: Hardware IPC
Mechanism for LTZVisor
This chapter presents how the DMA IPC and the AXI IPC hardware modules
were implemented, as well as the necessary LTZVisor and TZ-VirtIO modifications
to integrate both the FreeRTOS and Linux Guests and the hardware components.
It starts with an overview of the whole system and continues by delving deeper
into each section.
4.1 Overview
Before a detailed description of each individual component over the next sec-
tions, this section will present the general hTZ-VirtIO system overview. Figure
4.1 depicts the overall architecture of the system, with LTZVisor and TZ-VirtIO
as the software platform and the implemented AXI and DMA hardware modules
in the board’s Programmable Logic and Processing System, respectively.
The AXI module (hIPC) will be implemented in the SoC’s Programmable
Logic and connected to the Processing System via AXI protocol. As for the DMA
module (DMA IPC), it will use the on-board DMA Controller for supervising the
DMA data transfers. Furthermore, both mechanisms will access the TZ-VirtIO-
allocated block of shared memory for reading and writing the IPC messages, thus
being able to replace the TZ-VirtIO’s software-only data path.
The TZ-VirtIO mechanism will stay mostly intact, with only some necessary
changes, thus having the ability to choose between the three available methods
for the data transfer mechanism: the previous TZ-VirtIO implemented software
copy mechanism; software programmable DMA transfer; software programmable
AXI transfer mechanism. The choice of the transport mechanism should be user-
transparent and done for each individual case, as for each situation, each mecha-
nism will bring their own advantages and disadvantages. To choose which mech-
anism to use with each data transfer, each resource will be extensively tested and
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Figure 4.1: hTZ-VirtIO System Overview
their performance results will be taken into account. Moreover, each solution can
also function individually, and thus, there is the option of only including one, or
two, of the solutions to save hardware or software resources.
4.2 DMA IPC
The first implemented mechanism was the software-programmable DMA mod-
ule. Using the DMAC of the Zynq-7000 was an obvious choice to consider when
designing a system that intended to use hardware-based memory-to-memory trans-
fer mechanisms. In this FPGA-capable SoC however, there were two available
options for using DMA-capable transferring mechanisms: using the software-
programmable DMAC available on the board’s Processing System; use the hard-
ware-programmable AXI DMA IP. Because the second option is more suitable for
usage when the information is coming from an hardware module, and the other
chosen implementation (AXI IPC) already uses this strategy, the choice made was
to use the on-board DMA Controller.

















Figure 4.2: hTZ-VirtIO DMA-only System Overview
Furthermore, regarding the aforementioned problems of using a DMA-capable
hardware peripheral for IPC in a virtualized embedded system, it can be clarified
why this is not a problem for this implementation. First and foremost, because
LTZVisor and TZ-VirtIO are implemented in a TrustZone-enabled SoC, the var-
ious hardware components can be set as Secure or Non-Secure. This means that
both the block of shared memory used for IPC is configured as non-secure, as
can be the DMA channels that are set from the Non-Secure world. This ensures
that the untrusted DMA transfers cannot affect the secure partition. Figure 4.2
presents the hTZ-VirtIO System with only the DMA IPC implementation.
First off, because the DMAC is programmable and has its own instruction set,
this implementation should start with the specification of the instruction set. The
instruction format of the DMAC instruction set consists of a 8-bit opcode followed
by a variable data payload of 0, 8, 16 or 32 bits, always prefixed by a "DMA" word
to avoid confusion. The instructions can be for DMA channel usage only or for
both DMA manager and DMA channel. Some of the instructions are common and
similar to most instruction sets (DMAMOV, DMALD, DMAST), while others are
DMA specific (DMAGO, DMAEND, DMAKILL).
To program the DMAC one needs to store the DMA program (a set of DMA
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instructions) we want the DMAC to execute in its code memory. To easily pro-
gram the DMAC, the needed C functions were created and added to the DMA
IPC API. An example of a C function that adds a specific DMA instruction to the
DMAC program is represented in Listing 4.1. All of these functions will receive
as a parameter the pointer to the intended code memory address. The rest of the
parameters will change depending on the instruction. In this case, the DMAMOV
instruction needs the immediate value, as well as the directive to know to each of
the three possible registers (Source Address Register, Destination Address Regis-
ter and Channel Control Register) it should move the immediate value to. The
function will return the value 6, as it is the number of bytes it will occupy in the
code memory, which will be used in the API for pointer address incrementing.
1 int DMA_Instr_DMAMOV(char *DmaProg , unsigned Rd , uint32_t Imm){
2 /* DMAMOV encoding
3 * 47 ... 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 | 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
4 * imm [32:0] 0 0 0 0 0 |rd[2:0] | 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
5 *
6 * rd: 0 = SAR , 1 = CCR , 2 = DAR
7 */
8 *DmaProg = 0xBC;
9 *( DmaProg + 1) = Rd & 0x7;




Listing 4.1: DMAMOV Instruction
Other essential instruction pairs include the DMALD/DMAST, DMAGO/D-
MAEND, and DMALP/DMALPEND (DMA Loop and DMA Loop End instruc-
tions). A standard DMAC program comprised by these instructions will start by
the configuration of the source and destination address registers, and the DMA
channel configuration. Then, the DMALD and DMAST instructions will be con-
tained by the DMALP and DMALPEND instructions, forming the DMA data
transferring loop, where the DMALPEND instruction will check if the transfer is
complete and, if not, jump back to the DMALP instruction address. Some re-
maining, or unaligned, bytes might be left out of the loop and transferred through
consecutive DMALD and DMAST instructions, at the end of the loop. Then the
DMAC should signal the end of the transfer. The program will be finished by the
DMAEND instruction. Listing 4.2 presents a pseudocode DMA program.
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DMAMOV Source Address Register;
DMAMOV Destination Address Register;




DMALPEND check if finished transaction;
DMASEV;
DMAEND;
Listing 4.2: DMA Program Pseudocode Example
4.2.1 Controller and Channel Configuration
Firstly though, the DMA Controller needs to be initialized and configured
to handle the creation of DMA channels. Depending on the world security, the
DMAC instance will have different physical base addresses and each must be
accessed accordingly. Furthermore, if the DMAC is set in the secure mode it can
only be accessed by the secure world, but it can create both secure and non-secure
DMA channels. However, because there is a physical secure/non-secure separation,
both are configured and set to be used by each of their respective worlds. This
configuration is made at the LTZVisor’s boot and only changed by the secure
world, at most and only if needed, during a context switch operation. If set to
non-secure, the DMAC still can only create and set non-secure DMA channels.
During execution, before starting a DMA transfer, the DMA channel to be
used must be configured according to the expected transfer configurations. This
also includes setting up the needed information for the later creation of the DMA
transfer program, more specifically the information for the Channel Control Reg-
ister, Source and Destination Address, and the transfer length. The available
channel control parameters include the burst size and length for each source and
destination, as well as if it is an address incremental burst. The security of the
channel is also configured through the Protection Control bits. In the channel
configuration stage, the source and destination addresses, as well as the transfer
length, are also set.
Moreover, the setup of the channel interrupt for when the data transfer is fin-
ished should be done at this stage of the DMA channel configuration. However,
because this is implementation specific, the details on how it is done will be further
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explained in the section describing the integration with the LTZVisor. Nonethe-
less, at the most basic level, the DMAC should set the event for the corresponding
DMA channel, which means tying together the platform’s physical interrupt iden-
tification number (as each channel will have its own individual interrupt request)
with the handler for each of the channels. In this implementation however, all of
these interrupts are set to be handled the same way, as this implementation does
not care about which channel executed the transfer.
4.2.2 Transfer Setup
After configuring both the DMA Controller and one of the DMA channels
to use for the transfer, we are ready to then create the DMA program that will
execute the data transfer. To make this process easier, a function that generates a
DMA program was added to the API. This function will take all of the previously
specified configurations for both the DMA Controller and channel and create a
program with a similar structure to the pseudo-example presented in Listing 4.2.
So, after checking if the DMAC program memory is freed, the DMA program
will be generated, starting by the 3 consecutive DMAMOV instructions that will
configure the Source Address, Destination Address and Channel Control Registers.
The next step should be to program the data transferring loop, however, be-
cause the maximum number of burst transfers is 256 words, the procedure will
be different if the transfer is longer than 1024 bytes, or 256 times 32-bit words.
If the transfer is smaller than, or equal to, 256 words only a single loop will be
needed to execute the whole of the transfer. So, the next instructions in the pro-
gram will be: the signalling of the start of the transferring loop, including the
transfer length (DMALP); DMALD and DMAST instruction pair; and ended by
the DMALPEND instruction. On the other hand, if larger than 1024 bytes, the
transfer will have to be done in more than one loop. To achieve this, the DMAC
gives the ability to implement nested loops. An example on how to transfer 1024
words (4096 bytes) divided into four times 256 burst loops is presented in Listing
4.3.







Listing 4.3: DMA Nested Loops
Another consideration that has to be taken into account is the possibility of
tailwords and tailbytes. The first happen when the length of the transfer is not
divisible by the configured burst length. For example, if the DMA channel’s burst
length is set to 4 words, and the transfer length is of 30 words, the DMAC should
transfer 28 words in the main loop, and then transfer the 2 remaining words
(tailwords) in another smaller, separate loop (example represented in Listing 4.4).
Tailbytes happen when the desired transfer is not word aligned, meaning that the
bulk of the transfer will be done in the regular way, and the unaligned tailbytes











Listing 4.4: DMA Tailwords Handling Example
After generating the transferring loop two other instructions remain: the
DMASEV instruction, that will set the interrupt event for the specific channel (as
aforementioned, the physical interrupt setup and handling will be later explored
in the software platform modifications section); and the DMAEND instruction,
meaning the end of the DMA program.

















Figure 4.3: hTZ-VirtIO AXI-only System Overview
4.3 Hardware IPC
The other implemented hardware-based, data-transferring strategy was the
AXI IPC. This implementation uses the FPGA, Programmable-Logic, section
of the ZYBO board to achieve an application-specific hardware module capa-
ble of executing the best, tailored to the implementation, data transferring solu-
tion. Although the DMAC module present on the Zynq-7000 board already exe-
cutes this same operation, providing a zero-copy (no CPU interference needed)
hardware-based data-transferring mechanism, implementing our own hardware
module should lead to both a performance boost and latency decrease. By im-
plementing our own module, instead of using the on-board DMAC, we can follow
a minimal approach, thus bringing unnecessary latency down. However, some
drawbacks entail from this strategy, one of them being the obvious hardware cost
brought on by the use of hardware resources. This value is also kept down by the
minimal approach.
Like the DMA-based implementation, this hardware-based implementation











Figure 4.4: AXI IPC Module Architecture Overview
avoids the same problems of using hardware-based mechanism in a virtualized
environment, in the same fashion. Just like the DMAC, the hardware module
can be configured both as secure or non-secure, configuration which, when paired
with the non-secure setting of the shared-memory block of the TZ-VirtIO system,
ensures isolation between partitions, not allowing the secure world from accessing
and modifying secure, trusted memory.
All of the aforementioned reasons lead to the choice of an hardware module
as a theoretical viable option for the system. As such, the proposed hTZ-VirtIO
system architecture with an AXI hardware module is represented in Figure 4.3.
It consists on a modification of the TZ-VirtIO’s data path, transferring it to an
hardware-based solution which will receive the transfer configurations through an
AXI Lite Port and execute the transfer via two, High-Performance, AXI Full Ports,
one for read and for write. The event path is left almost untouched, with only an
extra notification being added for the signalling of the end of the transfer.
52 Chapter 4. hTZ-VirtIO: Hardware IPC Mechanism for LTZVisor
4.3.1 Hardware Module Overview
As aforementioned, the hardware module itself will consist on a main Con-
trol Unit module that will manage the main execution flow of the IPC hardware
module, as well as handling both Configuration and Transfer Ports, including the
transferring of data between the Read and Write AXI ports. Figure 4.4 represents
the general architecture overview off the AXI IPC module and the general direc-
tion of the data flow for both the configuration parameters, as well as the IPC
message data itself.
At its most basic level, the hIPC module will receive the necessary configura-
tions through the AXI Lite Configuration Port (Source and Destination Addresses,
Message Length), as well as the trigger signal to start the message transfer, and
using that information to execute a transfer between two memory blocks. With
the given information, and immediately after receiving the trigger signal, the hIPC
module will first trigger the read port, which will access the DRAM, more specifi-
cally the previously allocated Shared Memory portion, and read the desired mem-
ory addresses, starting at the configured Source Address and ending after reading
the number of addresses that were set through the Message Length Configuration.
In the meantime, the AXI write port will have also been triggered and started
writing the data read by the other port in the address specified in the Destina-
tion Address Register and with the same length. After finishing the transfer, the
control unit will trigger an interrupt, depending on the security of the transfer.
Because these operations happen at the same time, some extra considerations
have to be taken into account and they will be explained in more detail in further
sections.
4.3.2 Configuration Port
To interface between the software and hardware layer, the hIPC module uses
an AXI Lite port. By being register-based and memory-mapped, the AXI Lite port
allows for the software layer to send information to the hardware module by simply
writing directly to the previously allocated registers. In this case, the port is used
as the configuration port, having available three configuration registers: Source
Address Register, Destination Address Register and Message Length Register.
Furthermore, to initiate the transfer after having set the registers, the software
layer should write the trigger register.
Figure 4.5 represents the Configuration Port overview, with the four user-
implemented registers which are then outputted from the port to the control unit
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Figure 4.5: hIPC AXI Lite Configuration Port
module through wires. Not represented in the image are the control wires from
the AXI protocol that execute the handshake between the interfaces.
4.3.3 Transfer Ports
The main mechanism of the data transferring operation is made up by the
dual, unidirectional AXI Full interface unit. The AXI Full interfaces were used,
instead of AXI Lite ports, as to achieve the highest possible throughput, since
AXI Full has the option of using burst transactions up to 256 word-bursts, or
1024 bytes. Although a single AXI Full port is capable of performing both read
and write transactions, this implementation uses two individual AXI ports. This
choice, allied to the dual-port DRAM controller present on the ZYBO, makes this
a much better choice performance-wise. This is because a single AXI port can
execute both read and write operations but not simultaneously. Such operation is
only possible by using two separate AXI ports. To keep hardware costs down, and
because in this implementation these interfaces only need to work unidirectionally,
this implementation follows a minimal approach, removing the unnecessary hard-
ware resources that would enable the read port from writing in the memory and
vice-versa. This not only saves on hardware costs, but also simplifies the overall
implementation and execution flow.
There is a small drawback to this strategy however, which is the use of an
extra physical AXI channel. So, this implementation occupies two of the high-
performance AXI channels available on the board while still leaving two free chan-
nels for further use.
Figure 4.6 represents the overview of both of the AXI Full ports. Both receive
information from the hIPC’s control unit, namely, the address and size of the
transfer, as well as the trigger signal to start the moving of data. Both also
receive, from the DRAM controller the "done" signal, flagging the completion of
the operation. The read data from the read port will flow towards the control

























Figure 4.6: hIPC AXI Full Transfer Ports
unit module, which will then be handled and sent to the write port as quick as
possible. However, some synchronization between the data coming from the read
port and entering the write port is necessaryand it is executed by the control unit
as it will be explained in the following section.
4.3.4 Control Unit
The last, and more crucial, section of the hIPC module is its control unit. This
module is responsible for handling all the necessary configurations from, and to,
the AXI ports, as well as the message data to be transferred. The module can be
divided into four distinct sections. The first consists on the storing of the memory
addresses for configuring the interfaces to read and write the messages to as well
as the message length for configuring the length of the AXI burst. The control
unit also manages the triggering of both of the AXI channels at their due time.
The data handler sector manages the synchronization of the read and written data
since the data is not stored, more than a few delay clocks, in the module, as is
written directly to the final position. The final module, which can be included as
part of the state machine portion, is the "Done Handler" module, which, when the
transfer is finished, will trigger the hardware interrupt that will signal the software
that the operation is complete. Figure 4.7 depicts the modules and inputs/outputs
of the control unit module.
Because the AXI interconnect ports will not execute any operation until the
trigger is set, the configurations registers are directly hardwired to the AXI wires
that will be connecting to the DRAM Controller. This means that the Src_Addr
register and Msg_Len register are connected to the address and size inputs of the
























Figure 4.7: hIPC Control Unit
AXI read interconnect port, respectively, and the Dst_Addr register and Mes_Len
register are connected to the address and size wires of the AXI write port, also
respectively.
The next sector of the hIPC’s control unit module is its state machine, respon-
sible for handling the triggering of both read and write transfers and, through
the Done Handler module, trigger both secure and non-secure interrupts. To bet-
ter illustrate this behaviour, Figure 4.8 depicts the state diagram with the various
states of the control unit module. When a trigger is received through the AXI Lite
configuration port, the module will leave the idle state and enter the "Trig_Read"
state, where it will trigger the AXI read interconnect to start the burst read trans-
action. Meanwhile, immediately after receiving the "i_rvalid" signal from the read
channel, the module will move to the "Trig_Write" state, and consequently trigger
the start of the write transaction. After triggering both transactions, the state
machine will transit to the waiting state, and will remain there until both read and
write transactions are completed and the control unit receives the "Read_Done"
and "Write_Done" signals from both read and write interconnects, thus switching
to the "Signal" state. In this state, the Done Handler module will check the se-
curity of the transfer and signal either a FIQ or IRQ, promptly switching back to
the "Idle" state to wait for a new trigger.
Finally, the Data Handler module must synchronize the read data with the
write data. This is because the reading and writing of data are done simultane-
ously, but the data to be written is a few clocks behind, and it needs to be written
in the correct addresses. If the data is not on the correct position to be written,
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Done
Start Idle Trig_Read Trig_Write Wait Signal
Figure 4.8: Hardware Module General State Machine
the address is selected and the AXI Port is ready to write, the wrong data will
be written in that address. To avoid this, the data to be written is a few clocks
delayed to reach the correct address. Furthermore, because both channels are ac-
cessing the memory at the same time, some extra delay cycles are needed, as the
DRAM controller will not allow the memory to be written during a few cycles,
but the read port keeps reading the data.
4.4 LTZVisor Integration
After implementing the individual memory-transferring components, the next
step would be to integrate the individual components with the software platform.
This includes porting the necessary OSes to the LTZVisor, the VirtIO-based com-
munication mechanism between OSes and the final integration of the implemented
mechanisms with the rest of the system. Before adding the guests OSes, the
LTZVisor source file tree, as represented in Figure 4.9, must be slightly changed
to run FreeRTOS and Linux.
If not configured to run any non-secure guest, the first step should be to set
the needed memory blocks to non-secure, as well as setting as non-secure all of
the peripherals that the non-secure guest, the Linux OS in this case, will need to
access. This is done in the board initialization function of the LTZVisor, where all
of the devices security is set through the various TrustZone configuration registers.
To be able to run Linux, some modification need to be made to some of these
registers.
Regarding the memory security, because one segment is enough for both FreeR-
TOS and the LTZVisor, the remaining seven segments are set to be non-secure
through the TZ_DDR_RAM register. Linux also needs to use the board’s global
timer and for that the SCU access control register and SCU non-secure access
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Figure 4.9: LTZVisor’s File Tree
control register have to be set. Furthermore, for the non-secure world to ac-
cess the AXI Lite memory-mapped peripherals, the TZ_FPGA_M and the se-
curity_fssw_s0 registers have to be set, thus enabling the NS signal propagation
through the AXI general purpose ports and to the FPGA logic. Listing 4.5 repre-
sents the "board_init" function with the previously mentioned TrustZone security
registers. To be able to modify these registers, they need first to be unlocked by
writing the unlock key to the SLCR unlock register. After changing the desired
registers, the lock key must me written to the SLCR lock register, thus locking
these registers from modifications.
1 uint32_t board_init(void){
2 // Unlocking SLCR register
3 write32( (void *) SLCR_UNLOCK , SLCR_UNLOCK_KEY );
4 ...
5 // Handling DDR memory security (first 7 segments NS)
6 write32( (void *) TZ_DDR_RAM , 0x0000007f );
7 // SCU Access Control Register
8 write32( (void *)SCU_ACR , 0xF);
9 // SCU Non Secure Access Control Register
10 write32( (void *)SCU_NSACR , 0xFFF);
11 // M_AXI_GP0 Master Security
12 write32( (void *)TZ_FPGA_M , 0x3);
13 // M_AXI_GP0 Slave Security
14 write32( ( void *) security_fssw_s0 , 0x1);
15
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16 // Locking SLCR register
17 write32( (void *)SLCR_LOCK , SLCR_LOCK_KEY );
18 return TRUE;
19 }
Listing 4.5: Board Init Security Setting
Furthermore, to be able to use the global timer, the Linux OS needs to receive
interrupts from the global timer peripheral and thus, these also need to be set as
non-secure. This way, the interrupts are routed directly to the non-secure world
with no Hypervisor assistance. To achieve this, during boot, LTZVisor configures
the global timer interrupt as non-secure by setting the correct ICDISRx register
as non-secure in the GIC. Moreover, although not crucial for the functioning of
the Linux OS, the UART peripheral interrupt is also set to non-secure, so that is
able to be used by both secure and non-secure OSes.
1 uint32_t ltzvisor_hw_init(void){
2 ...
3 // Linux/FreeRTOS UART Interrupt - IRQ 82
4 interrupt_security_config(UART_1_INTERRUPT , Int_NS );
5 // Global Timer Interrupt - IRQ 27
6 interrupt_security_config(GLOBAL_TIMER_INTERRUPT , Int_NS );
7 ...
8 }
Listing 4.6: Interrupt Security Setting
In Listing 4.6 the LTZVisor, in the hardware initialization function, sets the
security of both the UART and the global timer as non-secure, using the previously
defined "interrupt_security_config" function.
4.4.1 Guests
Because the open-source version of the LTZVisor project, available on GitHub
[Pin18], only includes bare-metal guests, and the intended communication use-
case involves a dual-OS configuration, more specifically an RTOS and a GPOS,
these OSes need to be ported. The chosen OSes were: FreeRTOS for the secure,
time-critical world, and Linux for the non-secure, general-purpose side.
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LTZVisor’s, by design, includes the secure guest in the hypervisor source code,
compiling them together as a single image, but adds the non-secure guest pre-
compiled image during the LTZVisor’s boot sequence. This is due to the tight
relationship between the secure OS and the hypervisor, specially because of the
aforementioned hypervisor services that are transferred to the secure guest.
As such, modifications needed for both secure and non-secure guests are dif-
ferent from each other. FreeRTOS needed to be modified and included in the
hypervisor’s file tree, and compiled alongside it, while the Linux image needed to
be modified and compiled individually, and later copied to the system.
Because this thesis’ implementation is based on the TZ-VirtIO project and im-
plementation, FreeRTOS and Linux versions were chosen according to previously
tested versions for the sake of coherency and simplicity.
4.4.1.1 FreeRTOS
Regarding the secure world RTOS, the chosen OS was the FreeRTOS, more
specifically version 7.0.2. Although this is an older version (more updated version
as of the writing of this thesis is version 10.1.1), it serves the purpose for the
system implementation.
First, the FreeRTOS source code has to be copied to the LTZVisor’s file tree
(Figure 4.10). Then, because both are compiled together in the same image, the
LTZVisor’s makefile needs to be altered to allow compiler and linker to add the
FreeRTOS files during the making of the image. This includes adding the new
FreeRTOS folder paths for both the source files and the included libraries, as well
as adding the "objects.mk" files for the output object files.
Thee modifications to the FreeRTOS source code for the porting to the LTZVi-
sor, mainly consisted on adding the needed FIQ handlers to FreeRTOS. This is
due to two reasons: the secure side is set to handle all FIQs; the secure world
is responsible for the partitions’ scheduling, due to the LTZVisor’s asymmetric
scheduling policy. As such, two new situations have to be considered for FreeR-
TOS to handle as FIQs: the normal FreeRTOS scheduling mechanism has to be
changed from IRQs to FIQs; FreeRTOS must deal with FIQs from the non-secure
world, which will either be triggered by SMCs or the system tick.
4.4.1.2 Linux
The main difference between the secure and non-secure OSes included in LTZ-
Visor is that, while FreeRTOS is compiled alongside the hypervisor layer, the
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Figure 4.10: FreeRTOS Source Code in LTZVisor’s File Tree
non-secure Linux OS is compiled by itself, and the image is then included dur-
ing the LTZVisor’s boot. This brings forward some considerations: the non-
secure OS does not need as many modifications; this strategy is much closer to a
full-virtualization strategy. Though, some modifications are still required, these
mainly consists on modifying the ".dts" device tree file, disable FIQs, and compil-
ing Linux to the address established in the LTZVisor.
The Linux version chosen was the 2015.4 Xilinx version made available by
Xilinx on their Git repository. Xilinx also has available a few default configurations
for their various SoCs, including for the Zynq-7000-based boards like the ZYBO.
So, the first step was to apply the Zynq configurations to the Linux Kernel code.
However, as aforementioned, some modification are required, since Linux will run
atop the LTZVisor and as the non-secure guest. This entails modifications mainly
to the Linux kernel image.
So, the first modifications executed were to the Linux device tree, or the ".dts"
file. Again, following a minimal approach, only the absolutely necessary devices
were maintained to be mapped in the Linux device tree, such as the global timer,
interrupt controller and UART peripherals, along with the more obvious CPU,
memory and SLCR mappings. Furthermore, because the Linux OS cannot use
the whole of the DRAM, its start address had to be modified.
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Still regarding the alterations to the Linux kernel and because of the LTZVi-
sor’s interrupt model of routing FIQs to the secure world and IRQs to the non-
secure world, the FIQ stack initialization has to be removed. This will not be a
problem for the Linux normal execution, since no FIQ will even reach the non-
secure world.
Moreover, as Linux may need to access some secure components, even if me-
diated by the hypervisor layer, the ability to access those components, as well
as some secure CP15 registers and some SLCR, should be given. To achieve this,
three extra SMCs were added: secure_read, secure_write and secure_cp15_write.
These allow for the non-secure guest to access some secure resources, including the
CP15 and SLCR registers, under supervision of the LTZVisor. Listing 4.7 shows
the added system calls.
1 #define __ARM_NR_BASE (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE + 0x0f0000)
2
3 #define __ARM_NR_secure_read (__ARM_NR_BASE + 6)
4 #define __ARM_NR_secure_write (__ARM_NR_BASE + 7)
5 #define __ARM_NR_secure_cp15_write (__ARM_NR_BASE + 8)
Listing 4.7: Added SMCs
After executing all the necessary modifications to the Linux kernel, the next
step should be to compile it. To do this, the chosen toolchain was the GCC Linaro
cross-compiling toolchain for the 32-bit ARMv7 architecture.
To complete the whole Linux image, we then include the rest of the components
to a single image of the LTZVisor. To achieve this we used the zcomposite Linux
bootloader, a minimal Linux bootloader that comprises all of the absolutely nec-
essary components, the previously compiled Linux kernel, the file system and the
device tree blob (generated according to the Device Tree file), into a single ".elf"
binary file. This is described in the zynq_linux_boot.lds file, a script file containing
the general offset of the whole Linux image, and the partial offsets for each indi-
vidual sections. Listing 4.8 contains the zynq_linux_boot.lds file with each section
offset. The first represented section is the previously compiled clearreg file, which
will clear the "Filtering_Start_Address_Register" to start the address filtering at
the correct memory address. Then, with the appropriate offsets, the next sections
will be the device tree blob, followed by the Linux File system (ramdisk image)
and the Linux Kernel.
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1 PHY_OFFSET = 0x2000000;
2 SECTIONS {
3 . = PHY_OFFSET;
4 .texts : {
5 _start:
6 clearreg.o(.text);
7 clearreg.o(. rodata );
8 }
9 . = PHY_OFFSET + 0x4000;
10 .textd : {
11 d.tmp(.data);
12 . = . + 0x1000;
13 }
14 . = PHY_OFFSET + 0x800000;
15 .textr : {
16 r.tmp(.data);
17 }
18 . = PHY_OFFSET + 0x8000;





Listing 4.8: ZComposite Linux Script
Finally, this script’s memory offset needs to match with the starting address
of the Linux image and the start of non-secure memory portion.
4.4.2 TZ-VirtIO Integration
After having the Linux image compiled and included in the LTZVisor, the next
step would be to integrate the already implemented TZ-VirtIO code [OMC+18]
with this LTZVisor version, so we can have communication between the two OSes.
To achieve this, the VirtIO drivers must be included both in the secure world side,
and the non-secure side.
To use the VirtIO layer in the secure world, TZ-VirtIO follows the implemen-
tation of the OpenAMP project to use the VirtIO drivers with FreeRTOS. So, the
aptly named "comm_lib" source folder is added to the LTZVisor directory and its
path added to the Makefile for compilation alongside the LTZVisor. Figure 4.11
presents the communication library introduced in the LTZVisor source code file
tree.
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Figure 4.11: VirtIO Communication Library Folder in the LTZVisor’s
File Tree
As aforementioned, because the secure guest OS is compiled as part of the
hypervisor layer, the FreeRTOS will be able to directly access the communication
library. Furthermore, some additions to the hypervisor layer are needed. These
mainly include the setup of extra interrupts for both the secure and non-secure
worlds, which will be used for the notification of each side for a myriad of different
circumstances.
Furthermore, some modifications were executed to the OSes source code for
using the TZ-VirtIO layer for communication. Although both OSes can be the
communication master in this TZ-VirtIO communication strategy, our implemen-
tation will focus on the use-case consisting of the secure world as the communi-
cation master, wanting to send information to the non-secure side, which will in
turn act as the communication slave.
Regarding the secure FreeRTOS guest, since the TZ-VirtIO Communication
library is already added to the LTZVisor code, the only addition needed to the
FreeRTOS code will be the application that will create the master communication
channels and send the message.
On the Linux side however, the VirtIO layer has to be added separately. This
includes the addition of the modified RPMSG driver and the remoteproc files, both
of which are modifications done by the TZ-VirtIO implementation to the Linux
original source files. Furthermore, and contrary to the FreeRTOS implementation,
the Linux OS features the slave application, that opposites the FreeRTOS master.
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As similarly done with FreeRTOS, interruptions relating to the VirtIO communi-
cation layer have to be added, including an extra SMC instruction for requesting
a secure world interrupt.
4.4.3 Hardware Modules Integration
The last step for attain the complete system should be the integration of
the implemented hardware modules with the LTZVisor and TZ-VirtIO layers.
After both guests are included, working and communicating via the TZ-VirtIO
communication mechanism, the hardware mechanisms should be integrated with
the system, replacing the software copy mechanism. Again, because the use-case
consists on having the secure world as the communication master, the needed APIs
were included in the secure world side. However, because we want the ability of
interchanging between the various mechanisms, for now, the introduced code for
the hardware mechanisms’ APIs will be included for compilation one at a time,
being possible to alternate between them through three makefile defined macros.
This facilitates the switch between mechanisms while reducing the number of lines
of code.
4.4.3.1 DMA IPC
To integrate the DMA module with the LTZVisor code, the "DMA.c" file, con-
taining the DMA module API functions aforementioned in the DMA IPC module
implementation section, was included in the "comm_lib" directory.
During the LTZVisor hardware boot, the DMAC is configured using the DMA
initialization function, thus enabling its further use for the creation of DMA chan-
nels and transfers. The next step was to replace the "env_memcpy" function
used in the rpmsg TZ-VirtIO drivers that executed the data transfer between
source and destination addresses, with the "DMA_Transfer" function. Because
the DMAC was previously configured by default, this function will only setup the
DMA channel used for the transfer, receiving as parameters the same variables
that the memory copy mechanism needs: source address, destination address and
message length. Listing 4.9 shows the addition of the DMA Transfer method.
1 void env_memcpy(void *dst , void const *src , unsigned long len){
2 #ifdef DMA_IPC
3 DMA_Transfer(DmaInst , &DmaInst ->Config , src , dst , len);
4 #endif
5 }
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Listing 4.9: DMA Transfer Function Addition
Although the DMA transfer is executed by these two functions, some extra
modifications need to be carried out. Unlike the software memory copy, when
using an hardware-based memory copy mechanism, the CPU is freed while the
message is being transferred, and the LTZVisor will follow its execution flow.
However, some considerations have to be taken into account:
• The communication mechanism task must come to an halt while the message
transfer is being executed, as it assumes that the transfer is complete;
• The TZ-VirtIO mechanism must notify the non-secure guests when the mes-
sage is delivered;
• Synchronism must be achieved while using the hardware resources.
Taking into account these new concerns, that emerged from the replacing of the
transferring mechanism, some additions committed to the rpmsg driver, consisting
on:
• New mutex added, controlling the access to the hardware transferring mech-
anism, locking/unlocking whilst being used;
• Addition of a new interrupt, triggered by the hardware module.
So, there was the necessity of configuring the new hardware interrupt for the
DMA transfer finish event. Listing 4.10 represents the setup of the first DMA
channel interrupt, consisting on the security setting of the interrupt (set as secure
to be handled by the communication master, secure world), enabling and linking
the according interrupt handler.
1 #define DMA_Channel_1 46
2
3 uint32_t ltzvisor_hw_init (){
4 ...




9 void SetupDMAInterrupt (){
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10 interrupt_enable(DMA_Channel_1 , TRUE);
11 vFreeRTOS_handler_set(DMA_Channel_1 , handler_DMA_IPC );
12 }
Listing 4.10: DMA Interrupt Setup
Finally, during the LTZVisor execution, and when the DMA interrupt was trig-
gered, the "handler_DMA_IPC" function, represented in Listing 4.11, will clear
the interrupt (both the DMA and GIC flags), notify the non-secure Linux guest,
and give the previously taken semaphore back to the system, thus allowing for
other tasks to access the DMAC and for the communication task to do its final
clean-up.
1 void handler_DMA_IPC(uint32_t int_id ){
2 // Clear the GIC Interrupot Flag
3 interrupt_clear(int_id , get_cpu_id ());
4 // Clear the DMA Interrupt Flag
5 *DMA_Clean_ptr = 0xFF;
6 if(ipc_semaphore != NULL){





Listing 4.11: DMA Interrupt Handler
4.4.3.2 AXI IPC
As for the AXI IPC hardware module, its software integration should be much
simpler than that of the DMA API, since no previous setup is needed because
all of it is done through the hardware logic. So, like the DMA implementation,
the software memory copy mechanism was replaced with the configuration of the
AXI hardware module. This is done by writing to the AXI Lite port configuration
registers and finishing by triggering the start of the transfer in the same fashion
(Listing 4.12).
1 void env_memcpy(void *dst , void const *src , unsigned long len){
2 #ifdef AXI_IPC
3 *( IPC_address + 0) = len;
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4 *( IPC_address + 1) = src;
5 *( IPC_address + 2) = dst;
6 // STart the transfer
7 *( IPC_address + 4) = 0x1;
8 #endif
9 }
Listing 4.12: AXI Transfer Function Addition
This way, the hardware transfer is completed but, like the DMA module, the
same synchronism and interruptions additions must be featured. So, Listing 4.13
shows the configuration of the AXI IPC module interrupt, similar to the afore-
mentioned DMA.
1 #define AXI_int 61
2
3 uint32_t ltzvisor_hw_init (){
4 ...




9 void SetupAXIInterrupt (){
10 interrupt_enable(AXI_int , TRUE);
11 vFreeRTOS_handler_set(AXI_int , handler_AXI_IPC );
12 }
Listing 4.13: AXI Interrupt Setup
Finally the AXI IPC interrupt handler will clear both GIC’s interrupt flag and
the hardware module’s trigger register, thus resetting the module. The Linux side
is also notified and the IPC mutex is unlocked for further use (Listing 4.14).
1 void handler_AXI_IPC(uint32_t int_id ){
2 // Clear the GIC Interrupot Flag
3 interrupt_clear(int_id , get_cpu_id ());
4 // Clear the DMA Interrupt Flag
5 *( IPC_Clean_ptr + 4) = 0x0;
6 if(ipc_semaphore != NULL){
7 // Notify the Linux Guest OS
8 virtqueue_kick(rdev_1 ->tvq);
9 }
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10 xSemaphoreGive(ipc_semaphore );
11 }
Listing 4.14: AXI Interrupt Handler
5. Evaluation
In this section, the test and evaluation of the hTZ-VirtIO implementation are
presented. This encompasses the explanation of how and why these tests, and
comparisons with the previous implemented TZ-VirtIO software mechanism, were
executed, followed by the presentation of the results, divided into each section:
engineering effort, memory footprint, hardware costs and performance. Also, each
section will also discuss the impact and reasons for each attained results and
metrics.
To evaluate the implemented system, the hTZ-VirtIO system was deployed in
the Xilinx’s ZYBO board, a Zynq-7000 SoC featuring a dual ARM Cortex A9
processor, used in a single-core configuration and running at 650 MHz. Because
the main goal of the project was to replace the software-based IPC mechanism
with hardware modules, the executed evaluation was centred on the comparison
between the various mechanisms.
5.1 Engineering Effort
The first evaluated measure was the engineering effort required for the imple-
mentation of each method. To determine this metric, the number of code lines
for each strategy was used. This is a standard method of approximating the en-
gineering effort for software, and in this case hardware, development. Although
not absolute, specially when comparing between software (C and ARM Assembly
language) and hardware (Verilog language) code, this estimate will sufficiently
demonstrate the desired metric.
To count the Lines-of-Code (LoC) number, a static analysis tool was used: the
Understand software by SciTools. By using this tool we were able to count the
number of both software and hardware LoC for each of the implementations.
Figure 5.1 represents the LoC value for 4 different scenarios, none of which
include the Linux OS, as it is constant and not relevant, and the number of LoC
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Figure 5.1: Comparison between Line-of-Code Number
would be too great, thus masking the true comparison between the mechanisms.
The different scenarios are:
• LTZVisor: containing the LTZVisor and FreeRTOS code;
• LTZVisor + TZ-VirtIO: containing the same components as the LTZVisor
version, but including the TZ-VirtIO communication layer;
• LTZVisor + TZ-VirtIO + DMA: containing LTZVisor, FreeRTOS, TZ-Virt-
IO layer and the DMA API;
• LTZVisor + TZ-VirtIO + AXI: containing the LTZVisor, FreeRTOS and the
Verilog code (represented with a different colour) for the AXI IPC module.
Although not directly relevant to the context of this thesis’ evaluation, the
first LTZVisor evaluation (without the communication layer) was maintained as
a way of demonstrating the scale of the LoC increase for each mechanism. So, as
observed in the Figure 5.1 graph, the inflation of adding the communication layer
is of a much bigger nature, almost 95% increase (from 4492 to 8793 LoC) than
that of the addition of the hardware mechanisms.
Compared to the software implemented mechanism, the DMA IPC mechanism
represented a 9% increase in LoC number. This is due to the addition of the
DMA API as well as the the DMA mechanism interrupt handler. As for the AXI
IPC implementation, the increase in software LoC was of only 3%, but it brought
an extra 1242 Verilog LoC, thus totalling a 16% increase when compared to the
default TZ-VirtIO implementation.
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5.2 Memory Footprint
To obtain the memory footprint values for each of the implemented solutions,
the ARM GNU toolchain’s Size tool was used. This tool is able to calculate the
memory overhead of an output or image file divided into three different sections:
• .text: containing the executable code, as well as constant variables and
vector tables;
• .data: containing initialized system variables;
• .bss: containing non-initialized system variables, stack and heap dynamic
variables.
Using this evaluation strategy, we were then able to compare the memory
overhead of each of the implemented mechanisms. Again, for contextualization,
the standalone LTZVisor layer, without the TZ-VirtIO layer was included. Unlike,
the previous section, the Linux OS is included for the calculation of the ".elf" size,
as for the TZ-VirtIO layer to be compiled and working, the non-secure Linux guest
must be present.
Memory Footprint in Bytes
LTZVisor Version .text .data .bss Total
LTZVisor 15022382 484 460448 15483314
LTZVisor + TZ-VirtIO 15055023 1460 461136 15517619
LTZVisor + TZ-VirtIO + DMA 15065141 1476 463592 15530209
LTZVisor + TZ-VirtIO + AXI 15055583 1468 461128 15518179
Table 5.1: LTZVisor and TZ-Virtio Memory Footprint
As observed in Table 5.1, the increase brought on by the addition of the com-
munication layer itself is of a much greater relevance than the size increase of
both hardware data-transferring mechanisms. This is due to the smallness of the
implemented software APIs, specially with the AXI implementation, where most
of the code is Verilog code, and not part of the measured ".elf" image.
5.3 Hardware Costs
To evaluate the hardware costs of the implemented AXI IPC mechanism, we re-
curred to Vivado’s utilization report statistics, which present the statistics for each










Figure 5.2: Hardware Resource Utilization Statistics
of the FPGA Configure Logic Block types. In this case, the resources’ types usage
consisted of Global Buffers (BUFG), Flip-Flops (FF), Look-Up Tables (LUT) and
Look-Up Table RAMs (LUTRAM).
So, the post-implementation reports of the hardware resource usage for the
implemented module are represented in Figure 5.2, with each block type showing
its usage percentage of that specific hardware resource available on the ZYBO
board, as well as its definite number value. These results are presented in further
detail in Table 5.2.
Block Type Utilization (nr) Available (nr) Percentage (%)
BUFG 1 32 3.13
FF 4607 35200 13.09
LUTRAM 545 6000 9.09
LUT 4212 17600 23.93
Table 5.2: Hardware Resource Utilization Statistics
Although these results cannot be directly comparable to any of the other im-
plementations, since both do not implement FPGA logic, we can say that imple-
mentation still fits the solution, as it does not entail much hardware costs. All of
the used resources were far from occupying half of the FPGA fabrics on the ZYBO
board FPGA fabrics, which is the entry board for the Zynq-7000 line of SoCs.
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5.4 Performance
To measure the various metrics related to the system performance, the Perfor-
mance Monitoring Unit (PMU) present on the ZYBO board was used. The PMU
was used in its cycle counter mode, which is capable of counting every proces-
sor clock cycle. So, the PMU is used to count how many clock cycles a certain
operation, that is intended to be measured, takes. Because, as aforementioned,
the ZYBO board’s CPU clock is set to 650 MHz, each clock cycle will take 1,53
nanoseconds. Thus, at each 1,53 nanoseconds, the PMU will count one cycle.
5.4.1 Baremetal
Before evaluating the performance of the hardware mechanisms integrated in
the TZ-VirtIO layer, we must first measure its baremetal performance as a data
transfer mechanism. This will demonstrate their standalone performance and data
throughput before integrated with the Hypervisor and TZ-VirtIO layer.
Figure 5.3 presents the data throughput for each of the mechanisms that are
used in the TZ-VirtIO and hTZ-VirtIO systems. The data transfer length was
varied from 16 to 65536 bytes, duplicating with each data step increase. This al-
lows for each mechanism behaviour to be evaluated when the data length is being
varied. Observing the resulting graph (Figure 5.3), we can verify that the software
copy mechanism (using a memcpy function) is mostly constant and presenting a
much smaller data throughput than both of the hardware transfer mechanisms,
capping at 150Kbps. For the smaller data sizes however (less than 32 bytes trans-
ferred), the software mechanism presents a marginally better throughput.
As for the AXI mechanism, its data throughput increases exponentially. How-
ever, the throughput peaks at 1.38 Gbps when the transfer size is of 1024 bytes.
This is due to the maximum burst transfer of the AMBA Interconnect being of 256
words of 32 bits each, which means that, when the transfer length is bigger than
1024 bytes, for each 256 extra words, the hardware transfer has to re-triggered. Be-
cause of this, the data throughput when using this mechanism drops significantly
when above a 1024 bytes transfer, stabilizing at a 775 Kbps data throughput.
Finally, the DMA implementation presents a much lesser data throughput for
smaller message sizes, but increases greatly after a 1024 bytes transfer size, value
at which it has bigger throughput than that of the software mechanism. When
compared to the AXI mechanism, the DMA will have a bigger throughput for any
transfer size bigger than 8192 bytes.
















Figure 5.3: Baremetal Throughput Comparison
So, in a baremetal application, each software mechanisms will present advan-
tage regarding transfer sizes of:
• Software mechanism: any transfer size smaller than 32 bytes;
• AXI mechanism: from 32 to 8192 bytes transfer size;
• DMA mechanism: transfer lengths bigger than 8192 bytes.
5.4.2 hTZ-VirtIO
To properly compare the performance of the various transfer mechanisms in-
tegrated in the TZ-VirtIO layer, this evaluation scenario followed the best case
estimate strategy. We chose this strategy as the only of way of effectively compar-
ing the various mechanisms, since having performance metrics measured in any
real use-case scenario would be influenced by a myriad of different external factors,
including:
• Number of RTOS tasks: any increase in the number of tasks executing
in the secure FreeRTOS, regardless of its priority level, will most definitely
interfere with the overall execution flow of the communication mechanism,
thus leading to performance degradation. Any task with lower priority than
the communication task will add latency between the sending of the message
and the notification of the non-secure OS, as this notification only occurs at
a world switch, which in turn only occurs in the FreeRTOS idle times. Any
task with an higher interrupt level will execute before the communication
task, and thus delaying the communication;
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• Number of Linux Applications: like the FreeRTOS, the Linux commu-
nication response time will also vary depending on the number of executing
applications;
• FIQs: if a FIQ occurs during the communication task, the communication
performance will undoubtedly be affected. Likewise, the FreeRTOS tick
frequency may entail communication overhead.
So, to remove any unwanted interference that would jeopardize the comparison
between the mechanisms, our evaluation strategy removed any other real-time
task while maintaining only the communication task. As aforementioned, the
communication master is always the higher priority FreeRTOS, as it is the secure
OS that schedules the non-secure Linux OS, which is notified at a context switch.
Furthermore, because of the buffer size limitation of the TZ-VirtIO system, the
data throughput was varied in relation to the message size, and also the number
of messages sent.
Like the previously mentioned evaluation, to measure both the data through-
put and message latency for the different message sizes, the PMU was used. To
measure the data throughput, the PMU was ordered to start measuring just before
the message transfer is started by the secure OS and stopped when the Linux OS
receives the whole message. Regarding the latency, the PMU measured the time
that the FreeRTOS took from the start of the communication application, to the
freeing of the CPU core. This shows the time that the secure OS is busy in the
communication task for each mechanisms.
5.4.2.1 Message Size Variation
First, for each mechanism, only the message size was varied, while only sending
one message between each context switch. This variation was made from 16 to
1024 bytes and both the throughput and latency were measured for each case.
As a reference for comparison, the measured results regarding the software
transfer mechanism are shown in Figure 5.4. Both latency and throughput increase
gradually with the increase of the message size, maxing out at 133 µs and 21 Mbps,
respectively, for a message size of 1024 bytes.
As for the hTZ-VirtIO transfer mechanisms, both the AXI and DMA mech-
anisms present a constant latency time when the message size varies, even if at
much different levels, since the AXI IPC latency is constant at 22 µs, and the DMA
IPC is at a much higher latency time of 1.8 ms. This is due to the data transfer
itself being made through the hardware layer, and the setup time not depending









































































(b) DMA Message Size Variation Performance
Figure 5.5: hTZ-Virtio Message Size Variation Performance
on the size of the message. As for the throughput, its rise is exponential but,
like the latency metric, at very different values, with the maximum throughput
for both mechanisms being of 25 Mbps for the hardware implementation, and 3.9
Mbps for the DMA implementation. Both results are displayed in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.6 presents the comparison between the software and AXI IPC trans-
fer mechanisms for both latency and throughput measurements. The DMA IPC
mechanism was removed from the comparison as its latency magnitude is too
large, and throughput magnitude too small, when compared to the Software and
AXI IPC mechanisms. When only the message size is varied, the data through-
put of both mechanisms will be closer, with a small advantage to the AXI IPC
mechanism, while the latency will be constant and much smaller in the AXI IPC
method, thus giving it an advantage. This means that in this scenario, although
the message won’t arrive much quicker to the non-secure OS, the secure OS perfor-
mance will be much greater when using the AXI IPC mechanism, as the software
overhead, and thus performance overhead, will be much lesser when compared to





























Figure 5.6: Message Size Variation Performance Comparison
the software-based implementation.
5.4.2.2 Message Number Variation
After testing and evaluating the behaviour of the various mechanisms by vary-
ing the TZ-VirtIO message size, the next step would be to evaluate the perfor-
mance, latency and data throughput, when the number of messages is varied. To
do this, the message size was kept at 256 words, or 1024 bytes, for bigger through-
put and lower latency, while the number of messages was varied between 1 and 64
messages, effectively varying the data length from 1024 bytes to 65536 bytes. By
doing this, we can effectively evaluate and compare the various mechanisms for
bigger transfer sizes.
As with the previous tests, both the data throughput and latency were mea-
sured for each mechanisms and while varying the total transfer length. Because
the number of messages is being increased, the notification of the non-secure side
only occurs when all messages are sent, and not with each message. This means
that the throughput and latency measurements will measure the total time from
starting the sending of the messages, to when the Linux receives all the sent mes-
sages.
Like before, the software mechanism was measured for comparison, and its
results are present in Figure 5.7. Because in this test the number of messages is
being doubled for each variation, the latency of the software mechanism is also
doubling, reaching a value of 8.5 ms for a transfer size of 64 KB. For the same
reason, the data throughput only has a small increase, stabilizing at around 25
Mbps.




























Figure 5.7: Software Message Number Variation Performance
As for the hTZ-VirtIO transfer mechanisms, its performance is presented in
Figure 5.8. Regarding the AXI IPC mechanism, represented in Figure 5.8a, we
can verify that the data throughput does not improve greatly with the increase of
the transfer size. This is due to the messages being doubled as a way of increasing
the transfer size, and not an increase in the message size. Because of the AMBA
interface limitations, the transfer improvement will only be as great as the biggest
standalone message of 1024 bytes. The same applies for latency, where the latency
will double consistently when the number of message doubles. For a transfer size
of 65536 Bytes (64 messages of 1024 Bytes), the data throughput reaches transfer
























































(b) DMA Message Number Variation Performance
Figure 5.8: hTZ-Virtio Message Number Variation Performance
Regarding the DMA IPC implementation, the performance variation for both
latency and data throughput metrics shows a similar evolution to that of the AXI
IPC evaluation, showing almost no increase in data throughput, while doubling the
latency with each transfer size duplication. However, and just like the evaluation

































Figure 5.9: Message Number Variation Performance Comparison
executed for the variation of only the message size, the magnitude of both latency
and data throughput performance is at a very different level than that of the
software and AXI IPC mechanisms, with the latency reaching values of 115 ms
and the throughput maxing out at only 4 Mbps.
Finally, Figure 5.9 presents the comparison between the software and AXI IPC
mechanism. As with the previous evaluation, the DMA measured values were re-
moved for being too outlandish and at a much different level than those of the other
mechanisms, not allowing a good comparison between the two remaining mecha-
nism. Regarding the comparison between the software and AXI mechanisms, the
difference between the two is noticeable but not massive, with the former maxing
out at 26 Mbps and the latter maxing out at 33 Mbps, representing a 26% increase
in data throughput for the maximum evaluated transfer size of 65536 Bytes. Re-
garding the latency however, the AXI IPC presents a much better performance
than the software mechanism, as the AXI latency results are consistently 6 times
smaller than the software implemented mechanism. As aforementioned, this will
result in much better FreeRTOS performance, as it will incur much less software
overhead.
5.5 Discussion
Taking all the above results into account, we can draw some conclusions re-
garding the various metric comparisons between the mechanisms, even if some
metrics should be taken into account with different degrees of importance. Be-
cause all metrics were based on the best case scenario for the functioning of the
IPC mechanism (this only applies to some metrics), we are able to get a true
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comparison between the mechanisms and thus take conclusions in regards to its
practicality for this system.
First off, we can promptly verify that the DMA-based IPC mechanism im-
plementation is not a suitable contender when integrated in the TZ-VirtIO IPC
mechanism. This is undoubtedly because of TZ-VirtIO’s buffer size limitations.
With the first baremetal test, we can verify that for the maximum buffer size of
the TZ-VirtIO system, the DMA IPC*s throughput is just as high as the software
mechanism. As such, when added to the TZ-VirtIO layer, the added latency proves
to be decisive for the DMA IPC mechanism, and its performance degrades signifi-
cantly. The latency increases aggressively and, consequently, the data throughput
decreases in the same order, even going as far as degrading the performance of the
TZ-VirtIO system.
However, although not suitable for the TZ-VirtIO IPC implementation, this
does not invalidate the use of DMA for any other IPC mechanism. In fact, the
use of DMA-capable mechanisms for IPC has been tried and trusted for a myriad
of systems, and the performance results of the baremetal evaluation, as well as
the small engineering effort and memory footprint added, can prove precisely
that fact. For bigger message sizes, the DMA mechanism throughput is much
greater than that of the other mechanisms, and because of its implementation,
the throughput will reach its maximum capacity and much higher values. This
means that the throughput will most certainly dwarf the added latency, and make
such implementation viable.
Regarding the AXI IPC mechanism, when evaluated in a baremetal data trans-
ferring approach, we can verify that its maximum throughput peak occurs at the
maximum buffer size of the TZ-VirtIO system. This bodes well for the imple-
mentation mechanism, and it is in fact verified by the hTZ-VirtIO measurements.
Because its setup latency is so low, and its data throughput so high, when com-
pared to the software mechanism, especially when using the maximum message
size, the AXI IPC implementation suits the TZ-VirtIO mechanism perfectly. The
integration of this mechanism with the TZ-VirtIO system will not only increase
the data throughput, but also, and perhaps more importantly, reduce the latency
and software overhead. This is crucial in any critical system, as the secure, critical
OS will spend much less time in the communication tasks, thus maintaining its
real-time capabilities. This translates into an overall better mechanism and the
best implementation for the LTZVisor’s IPC mechanism.
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There are some drawbacks nonetheless, mainly the added hardware costs. Al-
though the added engineering efforts are minimal, and the memory footprint com-
pletely negligible, implementing an FPGA hardware module entails hardware costs
which must be taken into account. However, the hardware costs are still minimal,
only occupying a maximum of 25% on some FPGA fabrics on the ZYBO board,
which means that this solution is feasible on most low-end devices, and well worth
the trade-off between performance and hardware-costs.

6. Conclusion
The use of virtualization technology and hardware-offloading strategies on em-
bedded systems is definitely not a new concept. In fact, both have been raved
about consensually in the scientific community for their many benefits on solving
the problems that emerge when trying to keep up with the fast-growing needs of
the market and its consumers. The rise in complexity and dependability on safety
and security critical embedded systems is aided by the concept of IoT, where many
of these systems need to connect to some kind of network, thus making them more
prone to external attacks and of even greater complexity.
The use of any of these strategies as a standalone solution for the aforemen-
tioned problems became unfeasible for many situations. To keep up with de-
mand, many embedded solutions started combining more than one of these strate-
gies. SoC manufacturers developed hardware-based virtualization extensions and
FPGA components, which led system designers to exploit the hardware’s maxi-
mum potential, incorporating hardware-assisted virtualization and reconfigurable
hardware modules. This allowed the consolidation of multiple, very complex vir-
tual machines into the same hardware platform without any kind of performance
degradation, by the means of an underlying monitoring layer, the hypervisor.
Because of the desire to completely encapsulate these systems as a way of pro-
viding isolation and fault containment, these virtualized system, although sharing
the same hardware resources, are not able to communicate in any other way other
than with some Over-the-Air, for example, TCP/IP communication protocol. Un-
doubtedly, the use of TCP/IP communication in any critical, real-time system is
completely ludicrous, especially due to the sheer size of the network stack of this
protocol, meaning a great deal of software overhead and latency, which would most
assuredly lead to the lost of the system’s real-time capabilities. Instead, most hy-
pervisors implement an IPC mechanism, thus enabling communication via the
hypervisor layer, which greatly reduces the software overhead (when compared to
the TCP/IP network stack). However, in some cases the small software overhead
introduced by the addition of the IPC mechanism might be sufficient to affect the
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best functioning of the system.
So, this thesis proposes the hTZ-VirtIO IPC mechanism, an hardware-based
communication mechanism that consists on the offloading of the software-based
IPC mechanism for the LTZVisor, an in-house, open-source, TrustZone-assisted
hypervisor. This project focuses on the implementation of two different hard-
ware alternatives, as well as their integration in TZ-VirtIO, the VirtIO-based,
IPC mechanism of the LTZVisor. hTZ-VirtIO consists on the DMA IPC and AXI
IPC mechanisms. The first uses the on-board DMAC controller to create DMA
channels that replace the software data transfer of the messaging mechanism. The
latter, AXI IPC mechanism, consists on a software-programmable reconfigurable
hardware module that uses the AMBA interfaces and the AXI protocol for also
replacing the software-based communication mechanism of the TZ-VirtIO. This
hardware-offloading strategy provides reduction of latency and software overhead
whilst increasing data throughput, thus improving the system’s real-time capabil-
ities with the small added cost of the hardware resources. Furthermore, because
TrustZone’s security oriented hardware extensions extend the physical world sepa-
ration to the peripherals, FPGA and memory, the isolation and fault containment
of the various machines is maintained, as well as preserving safety and security
capabilities.
Although the expected benefits of hardware-offloading were not attained with
the DMA IPC mechanism, the hTZ-VirtIO AXI IPC mechanism performs as ex-
pected, greatly reducing software latency, increasing the mechanisms data through-
put, improving the real-time capabilities of the system whilst maintaining the
standards of the VirtIO system and the security of the TrustZone architecture.
6.1 Future Work
This thesis effectively implements an hardware-based IPC mechanism for the
LTZVisor as initially proposed. However, only one of the proposed mechanisms
adequately achieves the desired goals, as the DMA-based implementation did not
fulfil all of the established requirements. So, as a first step, further research could
focus on executing modifications to the DMA IPC mechanism and the TZ-VirtIO
layer to efficiently integrate the DMA IPC mechanism in this implementation. For
instance, the setup time of the DMA channel, which is the main reason for the
added latency, can be significantly diminished by fixating the core behaviour of
the DMA program. Removing some possible configurations of the DMA transfer
mechanism, like the transfer size, burst size and length, and setting them as default
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parameters, the DMA channel setup time could be greatly reduced, thus improving
in both latency and data throughput metrics.
Furthermore, future research could focus on the porting of these communi-
cation systems to other platforms, meaning both a switch of hardware or soft-
ware platform. For example, the hardware AXI and DMA mechanisms could be
ported to the µRTZVisor, another in-house TrustZone-assisted hypervisor, with
a microkernel-like implementation and multi guest OS support. Because this hy-
pervisor was also implemented in a Zynq-7000 SoC, the porting of the hardware
mechanisms would only consist on the integration with the hypervisor itself. This
could bring great advantages to the hypervisor as, being a microkernel-like imple-
mentation, the IPC mechanism is of an even greater importance, and reducing its
latency and enhancing its throughput would surely boost the performance of the
hypervisor [RSTP18].
On the other way around, the implemented mechanisms could also be trans-
ferred to other systems, even systems that do not implement virtualization. Any
FPGA capable board would be able to hold the AXI IPC module, and this im-
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